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ABSTRACT 
 
China and Africa‟s increased interaction over the past decade has received 
attention from the media, academics, economists and politicians alike. The 
rise of China as a potential world economic power has sparked both concern 
and suspicion. Concern over China‟s impact in African states has been voiced 
by Western and African leaders. The Chinese economy has experienced 
robust growth since embarking on ambitious reforms to open up its economy 
to outside investment and trade, as well as policies geared towards 
encouraging Chinese enterprises to go abroad. China‟s rise in importance in 
the international arena has led to increased scrutiny of its foreign policies and 
internal policies. In order to gain a balanced view of China‟s engagement in 
African states it is necessary to examine the various components of their 
involvement.  
 
This thesis has chosen to focus on CADFund as its main unit of analysis, and 
has illustrated that the Fund fulfils both a political and economic role in 
China‟s relations with Africa.  This study will explore the political and 
economic motivations behind China‟s interest in Africa. Conclusions are 
drawn from the structural organisation, investment approaches and projects of 
CADFund. The way in which CADFund fits into China‟s Africa policy will be 
determined by looking at the Fund‟s activities and how they fit into the 
principles set out in China‟s Africa Policy.  
 
The main question posed by this study was regarding the role which 
CADFund plays in China’s Africa Policy. The mandate of the Fund is to 
provide funding and advisory and support services to Chinese enterprises 
wishing to invest in African states. With 60 completed projects to date, the 
Fund has arguably indeed helped to progress the Chinese government‟s goal 
of encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa. 
   
Recommendations for future research are encouraged in order to build on this 
specific field. For example, more extensive research could be pursued 
concerning CADFund linkages with the Chinese government. Together with 
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this, questions regarding the perceived effectiveness of CADFund could also 
be addressed – specifically by investigating how projects are managed and 
monitored by CADFund. In these follow-up explorations, theoretical 
frameworks such as the “principle-agent theory” could also be incorporated as 
frameworks with which to view CADFund‟s relationship with the Chinese 
government. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
China en Afrika se verhoogde interaksie oor die afgelope dekade het baie 
aandag van die media, akademici, ekonome en politici ontvang. Die opkoms 
van China as ‟n potensiële wêreld ekonomiese mag, het gelei tot beide 
agterdog en kommer. Kommer oor China se invloed binne Afrika state is 
geopper deur Westerse sowel as Afrika leiers. Die Chinese ekonomie het 
ongekende groei beleef sedert hul vertek op ambisieuse hervormings, om hul 
ekonomie meer vry en oop te maak vir buitelandse belegging en handel, 
sowel as beleid hervormings wat daarop gemik is om Chinese ondernemings 
oorsee te bevorder. China se opkoms as „n belangrike moondheid op 
internationale gebied, het gelei to nadere ondersoek van sy buitelandse 
beleide. Om „n gebalanseerde beeld van China se betrokkenheid in 
Afrikastate te kry, is dit noodsaaklik om verskeie komponente van hul 
betrokkenheid te ondersoek. 
 
 
Hierdie tesis kies om te fokus op China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds (CADFund) 
as die vernaamste eenheid van analise en beskryf beide die fonds se politieke 
sowel as „n ekonomiese rol in China se betrekkinge met Afrika. Hierdie studie 
sal die politieke en ekonomiese beweegredes agter China se belange in 
Afrika verken. Gevolgtrekkings word gemaak van strukturele organisasie, 
belegging benaderings en projekte van  China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds. Die 
manier waarop China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds by China se Afrika-beleid 
inpas, sal vasgestel word deur te kyk na die fonds se aktiviteite en hoe hulle 
by die neergelegde beginsels van China se Afrika-beleid inpas. 
 
Die belangrikste vraag wat hierdie studie stel, is met betrekking tot die rol wat 
China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds in China se Afrika-beleid speel. Die mandaat 
van die fonds is om finasiering, raadgewende en ondersteunende dienste aan 
Chinese ondernemings te bied wat in Afrika-state wil belê. Met 60 voltooide 
projekte tot op datum, het die fonds inderdaad gehelp om  by te dra tot die 
Chinese regering se doelwit om Chinese ondernemings aan te moedig om in 
Afrka te belê. 
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Aanbevelinge vir toekomstige navorsing word aangemoedig om voort te bou 
op hierdie spesifieke gebied. Byvoorbeeld, meer uitgebreide navorsing oor 
China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds se bande met die Chinese Regering. 
Samehangend hiermee,vrae in verband met die vermeende doeltreffendheid 
van China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds kan ook ondersoek word - spesifiek deur 
te ondersoek hoe projekte bestuur en gekontroleer word deur China-Afrika 
Ontwikkelingsfonds. In hierdie opvolg ondersoeke, kan teoretiese raamwerke 
soos die ”principle-agent theory” ook ingesluit word as raamwerke waarna 
China-Afrika Ontwikkelingsfonds se verhoudinge met die Chinese Regering 
gekyk kan word. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 VII 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Sven Grimm, without 
his guidance, patience and support this thesis would not have been possible. 
His expert knowledge on the field of China-Africa relations have been of great 
benefit to me during this process.  
 
Thank you to my loving parents, Margaret and John Schickerling, for affording 
me the opportunity to study and for always encouraging me to pursue my 
dreams. Thank you to my brother John for his humour and understanding and 
to his wife Bronwyn for her wisdom and encouragement.  
 
Lastly thank you to my all friends and family, in particular to Pierre and Theo 
for their ongoing support during my studies and to Megan Bezuidenhout for 
always inspiring me. 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated in loving memory of my uncle Richard Matchett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 VIII 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Declaration                                                                                                      ii 
Abstract                                                                                                          iii 
Opsomming                                                                                                     v 
Acknowledgements                                                                                      vii  
Table of contents                                                                                         viii 
List of abbreviations                                                                                      xi 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction                                                                                1 
 
1.1 Purpose and significance                                                                   1 
1.2 Limitations and delimitations                                                              2 
1.3 Structure and chapter outline                                                              3 
1.4 Literature review                                                                                4 
 1.4.1 China‟s Africa Policy-rhetoric and meaning                                      5 
 1.4.2 China‟s renewed interest in Africa – Debates about motives              8 
  1.4.3 The appeal of the China Model of development                                  9 
  1.4.4 China‟s economic and political interests in Africa                                9 
1.5 Research Methods                                                                                    10 
 
Chapter 2: Contextualising China-Africa relations                10 
 
2.1 Introduction                                                                                                11 
2.2 Misconceptions                                                                                         11 
2.3 Historical context                                                                                       13 
2.4 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and CADFund                  14 
2.5 China‟s Africa Policy in Context of its Global engagement                       18 
2.6 Conclusions of Chapter 2                                                                          21 
 
Chapter 3: China’s economic relations with African countries   23 
 
3.1 Introduction              23 
3.2 Trade-Growing but imbalanced      23 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 IX 
 
3.3 Investment-Chinese engagement across the continent     27 
3.4 The quest for resources and new markets     30 
3.5 Africa‟s task: Making the most of it     31 
3.6 Conclusions of Chapter 3                                                                 32 
 
Chapter 4: Political motivations for China’s involvement in Africa 
countries                               34 
 
4.1 Introduction      34 
4.2 Background to political relations                                                       35 
4.3 The relevance of the „One China Policy‟      37 
4.4 South-south Cooperation as a central theme      38 
4.5 Attraction of success: the „China-Model‟      39 
4.6 Conclusions of Chapter 4                                                                         42 
 
Chapter 5: CADFund’s role in Sino-African relations                              43 
 
5.1 Introduction                                                                                              43 
5.2 CADFund‟s setting and operations                                                          43 
  5.2.1 Structure of organisation                                                        45 
 5.2.2 Investment approaches                                                          47 
 5.2.3 Projects undertaken                                                                50 
5.3 New strategic partnership?-FOCAC V discussions                                 52 
5.4 Conclusion of Chapter 5                                                                          55 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions                                                                             57 
 
Bibliography                                                                                         64 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1:China‟s Eight-Point Proposal Supporting African Development    16 
Table 2: CADFund Projects in South Africa                                                  51 
Graph 1: China and Africa‟s trade (1995-2010)                                            26 
Figure 1: China‟s FDI (2005-2010)                                                               27 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 X 
 
Figure 2: Chinese FDI in context                                                                  28 
Figure 3: Distribution of China's Direct Investment in African Industries (by the 
end of 2009)                                                                                                  29 
Figure 4: Organisational structure of CADFund (this figure still represents the 
old geographically based departments and not the new sector-based 
departments)                                                                                                  47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 XI 
 
LIST OF ABRREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
AfDB                                                 Africa Development Bank 
CADFund                                         China Africa Development Fund 
CDB                                                 China Development Bank 
EU                                                    European Union 
FAW                                                China First Automotive Works Group  
FDI                                                   Foreign Direct Investment 
FOCAC                                            Forum on China Africa Cooperation 
MOFCOM                                         Ministry of Commerce 
MFA                                                  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
PRC                                                  People‟s Republic of China 
PAC                                                  Pan African Congress 
SOEs                                                State Owned Enterprises 
UN                                                    United Nations 
UNDP                                               United Nations Development Programme 
UNSC                                               United Nations Security Council 
USA                                                  United States of America 
UK                                                    United Kingdom 
WTO                                                 World Trade Organisation  
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 
 
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
China-Africa relations are a contentious and current topic within academia, the 
media and the international political arena. Relations between China and Africa are 
often shrouded in speculative claims and controversial statements (Large, 2008: 45). 
The China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) was established as part of the eight 
measures announced by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 2006 Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The establishment of CADFund is part of the Chinese 
government‟s practical implementation of some of its plans and objectives for the 
African continent, of which have been laid out in its Africa policy. China‟s Africa 
Policy was released by the Chinese government in January 2006. This document 
outlines the principles upon which the Chinese government basis its relations with 
African states. It highlights the main political, social and economic areas in which 
China and African states should enhance their cooperation. 
 
The Chinese government asserts that its relations with African countries are mutually 
beneficial and that relations result in what has been coined a win-win situation. To 
imply that China-Africa relations are automatically or exclusively win-win, 
oversimplifies the nature of the economic and political interactions between the 
emerging world power and the world‟s poorest continent. Whilst China has achieved 
impressive economic growth in the last two decades, many African states are 
dealing with fundamental political and economic difficulties. In order to understand 
China-Africa relations and be able make well-informed deductions about China‟s 
involvement in African states, it is necessary to critically evaluate both the political 
and economic motivations which drive the Chinese government‟s interest in African 
states (Taylor, 2009:4).This is also the case for assessing the more specific 
instrument of CADFund.  
 
One of the main objectives of this study is to gauge the role which the Chinese 
government plays in CADFund. In academia and media alike, the Chinese 
government is often portrayed as a kind of monolithic entity which has control over 
Chinese businesses, organisations and people operating abroad. The Fund asserts 
that it is an independent organisation and that its decisions are guided by market 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2 
 
principles. From the onset of this study it was known that it is unlikely that the Fund 
operates completely independently from the Chinese government and yet the degree 
of involvement was unclear. One theory which would be useful in framing the 
relationship between CADFund and the Chinese government is the Principal Agent 
Theory. The use of such a theory would help in assessing what kind of mechanism 
have been put in place by the Chinese government to monitor or  even control 
CADFund‟s actions (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007: 220). One idea found in the Principal 
Agent Theory is the notion that the principal, for example the Chinese government 
cannot control every action of its agent, for example CADFund. So in order to 
maintain some level of control over the agent, the principal needs to have monitoring 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the agent is not simply pursuing its own agenda 
but rather is representing the interests of the principal as well (Lipsey and Chrystal, 
2007: 220). The main aim of this thesis is to identify the role which CADFund plays in 
China‟s Africa Policy, and therefore the use of the Principal Agent Theory was 
decided against, although elements of the theory are alluded to in the study when 
discussing some of the misconceptions regarding the Chinese government and its 
involvement with CADFund and when looking at the organisational structure of 
CADFund. 
   
1.1 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate questions pertaining to the how and why 
CADFund was established. The main research question of this thesis is “what is the 
role of CADFund in China‟s Africa Policy?” Questions pertaining to drivers of China‟s 
interests in African states will be investigated by examining the political and 
economic advantages which African states offer Chinese actors. This study aims to 
contribute to the academic debate by examining the broader nature of China‟s 
involvement in Africa and more specifically the role which CADFund plays in China-
Africa relations. 
 
One of the main objectives of this study is to gauge the involvement of the Chinese 
government in CADFund.  
 
In summary, the purpose of this study is: 
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a) to gauge what the main strategic interests of the Chinese government in 
Africa are and determine how CADFund is helping the Chinese side to 
progress their strategy. 
b) to investigate the Fund‟s activities to date against the backdrop of its mandate 
c) to highlight the role and approach of Chinese institutions such as FOCAC in 
China‟s Africa Policy. 
d) to investigate how CADFund operates  
e) to assess the possible role which CADFund is playing in China‟s Africa Policy   
 
1.2 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS  
One important limitation of this research concerns questions of conceptualisation. 
Key concepts in this discussion may be defined differently from the classifications 
used by other sources in the literature. The concept of what is meant when speaking 
of „China‟ may differ from source to source. As will be explored in this thesis, China 
constitutes a range of actors including the Chinese government, Chinese 
enterprises, Chinese institutions etc. Which actors are taken into account, by various 
authors, when using the term China is important as it impacts on the over 
understanding of Chinese involvement in Africa. In order to remedy somewhat the 
pitfalls associated with inconsistent conceptualisations of key concepts, effort will be 
made to be as concise and descriptive as possible regarding which Chinese actors 
are being referred to.  
 
Limitations concerning literature exist with regard to availability and quality. 
Discrepancies also occur in terms of the various methodologies and data-gathering 
techniques employed by researchers. While there has been a substantial amount 
written about China-Africa relations regarding their historical, economic and political 
engagement, few academic pieces have been written specifically on CADFund and 
its functioning. To overcome this gap in academic literature, news articles and 
interviews pertaining to CADFund have been utilised along with academic literature 
regarding various aspects of China-Africa relations. By doing so this study aims to 
provide a clearer understanding of what role CADFund is playing in China-Africa 
relations.  
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Regarding the interviews conducted for this thesis. One key limitation was the fact 
that the interviewees, in general, gave information found on the website and in 
CADFund‟s official brochure. As a result the interviews did not provide a substantial 
amount of new information or personal insight regarding the Fund. The reluctance of 
the interviewees to divulge personal insight regarding the Fund meant that the true 
inner workings of the Fund were not made clear. The use of more interviewees 
would have been useful. Interviews with those involved in projects set up by the 
Fund would have been useful, as it may have provided insight into the procedures 
which guide projects. Interviewing a representative from the government where the 
projects are set up, who had dealt with CADFund, would have provided a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of the Fund and its projects.  
 
This study will be delimited to the use of English sources. Although not a significant 
shortcoming considering that much of the literature, including official Chinese 
government papers regarding Africa, are published in English, it is necessary to bear 
in mind that no reference will be made to Mandarin sources. Furthermore, the focus 
of this thesis is on China‟s relations with Africa and not on Africa‟s relations with 
China, despite the overall importance of this perspective. .  
 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 will briefly examine the history of China and Africa‟s relations, this chapter 
will also discuss the formation of FOCAC. The chapter will also discuss China‟s 
Africa Policy, focusing on statements made in the Policy. The establishment of 
CADFund will also be briefly discussed. Chapter 2 aims to provide the background 
and context upon which the remainder of the thesis will be based. 
 
The next section of this thesis, chapter 3 and 4, will investigate some of the leading 
political and economic motivations for China‟s interest in African states. Economic 
factors such as resources and markets will be examined in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will 
focus on political motivations for China‟s involvement in Africa such as South-South 
Cooperation, the need for international allies and the working towards creating a 
positive image will be addressed.  
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The focus of chapter 5 will be on CADFund and how it operates as an institution. The 
structure and investment approaches of the organisation will be discussed. Some of 
the main projects which the Fund has been involved in will be discussed.  
 
To conclude chapter 6 will analyse CADFund‟s role in China‟s Africa Policy. The 
main findings of the preceding chapters will be presented in chapter 6.  
 
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The sources consulted in this thesis display a predominant focus on China and 
Africa‟s general engagement on a macroeconomic and political level (Alden, 2007; 
Alden et al, 2009; Brautigam, 2009; Gill and Reilly, 2007). Much of the literature 
seeks to highlight the background of China and Africa‟s relations as well as their 
growing economic involvement. Concerning previous research dealing with the topic 
of China and Africa‟s engagement, this thesis will consult various publications which 
will be expanded on in the literary review. Previous research has mainly focused on 
the increase in China‟s relations with African states (Uchehara, 2009; Large, 2008; 
Taylor, 2009 and Cheru and Obi, 2010). In addition, previous research has sought 
highlight China‟s rise as an international power and its renewed interest in Africa 
(Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2009; He, 2007 and Alden et al, 2009). A large portion of 
previous research has sought to investigate the influence which China is having in 
African countries, this has led to varying viewpoints on whether China can be seen 
as a responsible actor with a positive impact on African countries or whether China is 
another colonial force in Africa (Alden et al, 2009; Botha, 2006; Campbell, 2008 and 
Cheru and Obi, Edoho, 2012).  The issue surrounding China‟s impact in Africa has 
given rise to much debate and the issue of resource extraction is a contentious one.  
 
In order to enhance our understanding on the findings of research relating to China-
Africa relations in the contemporary era, it is necessary to consult various sources. 
Regarding the content of these sources, one sees how that existing literature on 
China-Africa relations examine various topics such as China and Africa‟s history, the 
China‟s economic activities in African states.  
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A gap exists in the literature regarding CADFund, very few academic pieces have 
been written about CADFund to date. Typically, the Fund is only mentioned briefly as 
one of the Eight Measures set out by President Hu Jintao at the 2006 FOCAC 
meeting in the consulted academic literature (Brautigam, 2009; Alden et al, 2009; 
Taylor 2011). This made gathering reliable academic information on the Fund a 
challenge. This study aims at contributing to the debate on Chinese-African relations 
by filling this gap. 
 
1.4.1 China’s Africa Policy-rhetoric and meaning 
Although the interaction between China and African countries has increased 
substantially in the past few years, it is important to remember that this interaction is 
not new. In her article “Balancing act of China‟s Africa Policy” Chinese scholar He 
Wenping asserts that China‟s involvement with Africa is not simply based on China‟s 
need for resources and is more complex (He, 2007).  She asserts that China and 
Africa‟s interaction is based not only economic interests but also on political factors: 
“China‟s Africa Policy transcends a mere quest for resources. While China‟s growing 
need for raw materials and energy is important to the country‟s engagement in 
Africa, it is certainly not the only, nor the key, factor” (He, 2007). In order to 
understand „interests‟ in African countries it is necessary to take into account China‟s 
strategic interests. He points out that in order to understand China‟s policies and 
motivations on the African continent, it is necessary to take a broader view that takes 
into account China‟s overall diplomatic strategic pursuits which include China‟s 
global position, its striving for the sustainable development of its economy and the 
need for political support on the important issue of Taiwan reunification and the 
prevention of secessionism (He, 2007).  
 
He (2007) argues that China‟s economy and its foreign policy makers need African 
states for many reasons, with a population of around one billion people the continent 
of Africa offers great human resources capabilities and importantly it offers Chinese 
exporters a market for its numerous goods. China‟s Africa policy is also inherently 
driven by its long-term strategic interests and the rise of China‟s international power. 
He notes that Africa should be regarded as an important actor in international affairs, 
especially as a key force for the world‟s developing nations: “Africa accounts for 
almost half of the non-aligned nations and a full third of United Nations member 
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countries” (He, 2007). According to He most African countries have proved “reliable 
supporters of China‟s position” (He, 2007). 
 
As a government of a developing country itself, the Chinese government claims to 
have faced many of the same issues and interests as developing countries in Africa 
(FMPRC, 2006). In the World Trade Organization‟s negotiations over agricultural 
issues, thanks to a firm stand taken by China and African countries to jointly 
safeguard their rights, the developed countries ultimately had to compromise and 
promise to lift trade subsidies for agricultural products (Manji and Marks, 2007).  
Sino-Africa relations also add to the Chinese government‟s interest in deepening 
what has been termed South-South Cooperation, that is the developing countries of 
the world banding together to promote and forward their own interests and not simply 
turning to Western countries for support (Owen and Melville, 2005).  
In 2006, the Chinese government published its white paper on African policy, entitled 
China‟s Africa Policy.  This is the first policy paper of its kind (FMPRC, 2006). In the 
paper beyond European conditionality and Chinese non-interference: an exclusive 
approach in regulating EU-Africa trilateral relations China- Africa scholar Chien Huei 
Wu notes that although China‟s Africa Policy does not provide detailed and in-depth 
elaboration, it has attracted much political attention and academic interests (Chien 
Huei, 2010). The Policy highlights, as Chien Huei points out, China being the biggest 
developing country and of Africa being the continent of the biggest number of 
developing countries (Chien Huei, 2010). By highlighting this fact the Chinese 
government is deliberately trying to form a sense of common interest (or 
camaraderie) with African countries and this has helped form the relationship 
between China and African countries.  China‟s Africa Policy puts forward general 
principles and objectives guiding China‟s foreign policy toward Africa (FMPRC, 
2006). They are namely: sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefit, reciprocity 
and common prosperity; mutual support and close coordination; learning from each 
other and seeking common development. The Chinese government reiterates its 
adherence to Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence and reiterates that “One China 
principle” is the foundation of the relations between China and African countries 
(FMPRC, 2006). These official lines are challenged and explored by academic 
writers. 
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China-Africa scholar, Chris Alden has written numerous articles and books on the 
subject of China in Africa. In his 2007 paper entitled “Emerging countries as new 
ODA players in LDCs: the case of China and Africa”, he points out that “though the 
official rhetoric of continuity speaks otherwise, the fact is that China‟s engagement 
with Africa has been episodic, shifting from periods of intense activism in the 1960s 
and early 1970s to outright neglect for much of the 1980s” (Alden, 2007). He asserts 
that in order “to understand the changing dynamics in China‟s approach to Africa, it 
is necessary to place it in the context of Chinese foreign policy from the inception of 
the Communist Party government in 1949 to the rediscovery of Africa in the 
contemporary period” (Alden, 2007). Alden highlights the fact that “for Africa, China‟s 
transition from an oil exporter to an oil importer in 1993 was a significant milestone in 
its development” (Alden, 2007). He notes that “energy resources are the most 
important focus of China‟s involvement on the continent, and occupy the bulk of the 
thrust of its investment and diplomacy, but other forms of resource-based 
commercial engagement with Africa play an important part in shaping trade and 
investment ties” (Alden, 2007).   
The Chinese government‟s principle of non-interference has been highlighted as a 
major guiding principle for its engagement with African states and has caused much 
criticism from Western countries, which see this stance has an irresponsible one. 
The principle of non-interference was again reiterated in China‟s 2006 Africa Policy 
and as scholar Jin Ling points out, in his article aid to Africa: What can the EU and 
China learn from each other?, has been a guiding principle for China and Africa 
since 1964: “since China‟s aid principles were first proposed in 1964, the „no 
conditions attached‟ principle has always been the most important one and was 
reiterated in China‟s Africa Policy Paper in 2006” (Jin, 2010). Jin makes the point 
that regarding the „no conditions attached‟ principle, two main points need 
clarification. “Firstly, in providing concessional aid, there will also be a kind of 
contract between China and partner countries specifically regulating the modes of 
implementation, which will effectively be a type of „condition‟, e.g. the project 
implementer should be from China, a certain percentage of procurements should be 
acquired through the Chinese market, etc” (Jin, 2010). These „conditions‟ are 
sometimes considered as a form of economic conditionality. Another of China‟s aid 
principles is the „win-win‟ principle, which is a way to achieve „win-win co-operation‟, 
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which is a kind of mutual economic investment. These economic conditions are 
clearly different from Europe‟s economic conditionality, which effectively dictates 
reform measures to be taken by partner countries (Jin, 2010). 
1.4.2 China’s renewed interest in Africa – Debates about motives 
In his book China‟s New Role in Africa, Ian Taylor has cited three main events as 
reigniting Beijing‟s‟ interest in Africa towards the end of the 1980‟s (Taylor, 2009: 14). 
The Chinese government‟s interest dwindled in Africa in the late 1970‟s when they 
were more focused on developing internally and modernising (Taylor, 2009: 14). 
African countries were technologically underdeveloped and the Chinese were more 
interested in “looking West” for guidance in its modernisation programme (Taylor, 
2009). The rationale behind supporting anti-Soviet elements in Africa became less 
relevant and thus Africa became fairly insignificant in China‟s foreign policy 
objectives (Taylor, 2009: 14) In the early 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese 
state underwent a number of reforms and began opening up its economy to the rest 
of the world (Taylor, 2009: 14). Then in 1989 the Chinese army used force against 
student-led protesters who were demanding greater freedom of press and political 
reform in China. A number of civilians were killed, causing an outcry internationally 
and boycotts and sanctions were imposed against China (Taylor, 2009: 14). During 
this time China found allies in Africa, sparking Chinese interested in Africa again. 
Secondly new reform programmes in Africa, in the 1990s, were looking promising 
and Beijing had hope that African economies would grow. Lastly China‟s rapidly 
growing economy meant that it was in need of new markets and raw materials, Africa 
offered the opportunity of both and lead increased interaction by the Chinese in 
African countries (Taylor, 2009: 14).  
In line with Taylor‟s assertions China-Africa scholar Debra Brautigam in her book, 
The Dragon‟s Gift: the Real Story of China in Africa, identifies the political and 
economic challenges as causing the Chinese government to become more involved 
in Africa (Brautigam, 2009).  Brautigam identifies The Chinese economy‟s rapid 
growth which was outpacing China‟s natural resources as a main factor in China‟s 
increased involvement in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Politically Africa has been 
important in the Chinese government‟s desire to be viewed as a responsible rising 
power and Africa has provided the Chinese government‟s with a chance to utilise its 
diplomatic skills (Brautigam, 2009).   Building schools, hospitals and infrastructure 
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around Africa has helped the Chinese government‟s gain friends among Africans 
which serves them well in international forums such as the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly where it is based on the one state, one vote principle. Although 
there is still much criticism surrounding China‟s engagement in Africa, China has 
been making a concerted effort to be viewed as a responsible emerging power in 
Africa, one which acts like a partner as opposed to another imperialist power. By 
exchanging resources for much needed schools, clinics and hospitals the Chinese 
government has improved the living conditions of many Africans which helps China 
look less like an aggressive colonial power and more like a partner, argues 
Brautigam (2009: 77).  
1.4.3 The appeal of the China Model of development  
In their article friends and interests: China‟s distinctive links with Africa Sautman and 
Yan (2007) discuss the idea of a China Model of development and its attractiveness 
as an alternative to the Western model of development, for African states. Similarly 
in his article beyond „dragon in the bush‟: the study of China-Africa Relations Large 
(2008) discusses the appeal which the China Model of development has for African 
states.   
 
1.4.4 China’s economic and political interests in Africa 
Attention has been given to China‟s economic ties in Africa, by both the media and 
academics. While economic motives are regarded as a major and important driver in 
the Chinese government‟s interest in African countries, political considerations are 
also a key factor. China-Africa scholars Gill and Reilly note that “China‟s interests in 
Africa go well beyond the continents wealth of resources and include important 
political and diplomatic considerations” as African states offer China a kind of 
diplomatic leverage (Gill and Reilly, 2007: 37). Numerous scholars make the 
argument that for China, Africa offers political and diplomatic gains as well as 
economic ones (Li 2007, Sautman and Yan 2007, Swan 2007, Taylor, 2009 Alden et 
al, 2009 and Brautigam, 2009). This thesis will explore both the political and 
economic motivations behind China‟s involvement in African countries. 
 
Building on the above broad literature review, the hypotheses of this thesis are the 
following four points:  
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a) The Chinese government – at least indirectly – steers the activities of Chinese 
enterprises and institutions operating in Africa 
b) CADFund is one instrument in this overall policy and is meant to furthering the 
principle of South-South Cooperation 
c) The Chinese government is mainly interested in African states for economic 
reasons, even though political perspectives are still relevant. 
d) Within the economic (and political) rationale, the quest for resources is the 
main driving force behind the establishment of forums such as FOCAC and 
institutions such as CADFund 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
This study is both explanatory and descriptive and therefore takes the form of a 
qualitative study, as it seeks to offer an investigation into specific cases and 
processes in a particular context in order to give and establish meaning (Babbie and 
Mouton, 2004: 71) 
 
The time dimension that this study considers will be since 2000, i.e. since the 
renewed interest of Chinese actors in Africa. The study will specifically focus on the 
time since 2006, i.e. since the time when the commitment to establish CADFund was 
announced. Using characteristics of cross-sectional and recent past time 
dimensions, both the recent past and present trends evident in China and Africa‟s 
relations will be investigated (Babbie and Mouton, 2004: 71) 
 
Data and literature pertaining to CADFund will be mostly obtained from primary 
sources obtained through interviews with CADFund representatives and the 
CADFund and the China Development Bank (CDB) website. This use of primary 
information is necessary as CADFund is relatively new institution and as such few 
academic pieces have been written about the Fund to date. Secondary sources such 
as current affairs and news media reports as well as academic journal articles will be 
made use of when examining the history and nature of China-Africa relations. This 
study will include the information gathered from two interviews. Interviews were 
conducted with two key decision-makers within CADFund. The interviews were 
deemed useful to this thesis as they provided perspectives from decision makers 
from both the Beijing and Johannesburg branch of CADFund. Due to the fact that 
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CADFund is still a fairly new organisation and as such little academic literature exists 
regarding the Fund, it was essential that interviews were conducted in order to 
gather primary information regarding the Fund. The Interviews were of a semi-
structured nature and interviewees were asked a series of questions but also asked 
to comment and add information they deemed relevant.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALISING CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
During China‟s Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s/early 1970s the country 
remained isolated from the international community. Even though today China is 
more globally integrated, the Chinese government remains comparatively less 
transparent about its internal affairs than Western governments, not least so the 
United States (US) (Taylor, 2009: 161). Lack of information regarding China has led 
to speculation and generalisation in many instances. This chapter will provide the 
policy context and background to the more specific analysis of CADFund. 
As part of the broader background, this chapter will discuss the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC was established in 2000 and has provided a 
platform for Chinese and African actors to increase their economic and political ties 
with one another. The Forum was started in 2000 as part of China‟s strategic foreign 
policy towards Africa to secure both economic and diplomatic interests (Grimm, 
2012: 1). One of the outcomes of the 2006 FOCAC meeting was the establishment 
of the China Africa Development Fund (CADFund) in 2007.  
Finally, the chapter will discuss China‟s Africa Policy which was released in January 
2006. The policy outlines the approach which the Chinese government wishes to 
pursue with regards to economic and political cooperation with Africa (FMPRC, 
2006).  The Policy serves a largely symbolic role as it sets out the principles upon 
which the Chinese government proclaims to base its relations with African states. 
The policy does not specify measurable goals but rather highlights the areas in 
which the Chinese government would like to improve cooperation efforts. 
 
2.2 MISCONCEPTIONS  
China-Africa scholar Daniel Large highlights in his article, beyond dragon in the 
„bush‟: the study of China-Africa relations, that research on China-Africa relations 
has been limited on both sides (Large, 2008: 46). The consequences of this lack of 
research, by the relevant parties, regarding China-Africa relations have been that 
China‟s presence in Africa states have been met with xenophobic attitudes at times. 
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Large asserts that in order to understand the relations between African countries and 
China, research must move beyond the “dragon in the bush” rhetoric which 
“describes and simplifies China as a monolithic dragon in an unvariegated African 
bush stripped of historical and political context” (Large, 2008: 46). There exist a 
range of actors who must be considered when analysing China‟s activities in African 
states. These actors include Chinese businesses, municipalities, provinces and the 
central government (which in itself is made up of various ministries and interest 
groups) all of these various entities have their own interests and strategies (Taylor, 
2009: 3).   
China is a one party state and while there have been major economic reforms in 
China, political and personal freedom is still limited. It is evident, however, that China 
is changing and that the government is losing some of its control over its citizens. 
Increases in protests across China indicate that Chinese citizens are unhappy with 
the current situation in China and that there is a desire for greater personal and 
political freedom (The Economist, 28 January 2012). The failure to address the 
grievances of its citizens internally indicates that the Chinese government is unlikely 
able to control all of the various Chinese individuals and enterprises living and 
operating outside its borders. This is an important realisation when trying to 
understand China-Africa relations. Indeed to understand the complexities of China‟s 
engagement in Africa it must be understood that China is not a unitary actor and the 
Chinese government does not have control over the activities of all Chinese 
enterprises operating abroad (Taylor, 2009: 3).  
Cold War media and even academic coverage of China‟s involvement in Africa can 
in many ways compare to today‟s coverage. During the Cold War era The PRC was 
viewed as an  
“intentionally destabilizing revolutionary factor in Africa versus China‟s 
[current] inclination to maintain the status quo” and the PRC was previously 
portrayed as an “ideological threat to newly independent African states versus 
China as an interest-driven threat to good-governance or democratisation 
today” (Large, 2008: 47).  
The vocabulary may have altered but the same concern about China‟s impact on 
Africa and African politics remains and has intensified as the engagement between 
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the states intensifies. In order to gain an objective understanding of economic and 
political relations between China and African countries, we must move away from 
sensationalising their engagement either by being unduly critical or overstating their 
involvement with one another. 
 
2.3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
China‟s engagement with Africa has “waxed and waned according to its domestic 
situation, Cold War politics and its dispute with the Soviet Union” (Alden et al, 2009: 
4). Throughout these changes China‟s involvement with Africa took different forms, 
its foremost motivation for engaging with the continent was not based on resource 
needs but was initially ideologically driven (Taylor, 2009:13). Africa initially became 
important for the PRC in the late 1950s when Chinese diplomacy began to take 
shape after the Korean War (Alden et al, 2009: 4). The first diplomatic ties which 
China formed with an African state were in 1956, with Egypt.  
During the 1960s and 1970s the Chinese government provided support for liberation 
struggles in African countries, a fact which has helped China gain favour with African 
leaders today (Aning and Lecoutre, 2008: 40).  Later as China began to move into a 
phase of socialist modernisation under Deng Xiaoping in 1980s, it began to focus 
inwardly and its involvement in Africa dwindled (Taylor, 2009: 12). The Chinese 
government was focused on pursuing modernisation policies for China‟s 
development and for this needed to gain knowledge and technology from countries 
that were more economically developed and technologically advanced than most 
newly independent African states. The previous rationale behind supporting anti-
Soviet elements in African countries had also dwindled and this meant that there was 
little reason for the Chinese government to be as involved in African countries as it 
had previously been (Taylor, 2009: 13).  
Chinese interest was reignited in Africa in the early 1990s (Brautigam 2009; Taylor, 
2009). This renewed interest was sparked by a few key events in both China and 
Africa. One such event was the Tiananmen Square uprising. From 15 April 1989 to 
4 June 1989 a series of demonstrations were held across China (Taylor, 2009:13). 
Protestors, mainly students, were calling for increased media and political freedom 
among other things. On 4 June protesters demonstrating in Tiananmen Square were 
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fired upon by the army (Taylor, 2009: 13). In the aftermath of this event, the Chinese 
government was criticised and diplomatically isolated by many Western states, not 
least by the United States. African countries for their part maintained relations with 
China during this time, resulting in increased ties between China and the African 
continent (Taylor, 2009: 14).  
Another factor which played a role in renewing China‟s interest in Africa were the 
reform programmes which were undertaken by many African countries, embarking 
on such reforms was an indication to the Chinese government that African states 
would be able to offer greater economic prospects for Chinese businesses (Taylor, 
2009: 14). Lastly China‟s rapidly growing economy and industrialisation during the 
late 1980s and 1990s meant that the country was in demand for raw materials to 
support further economic expansion and a market for its growing output of 
exportable products (Brautigam, 2009: 78). Often regarded as a watershed moment 
is 1993, when China became a net importer of oil. This is understood to have had a 
profound impact on Chinese foreign policy, particularly towards oil rich African states 
(Eisenman et al, 2007: 29). From a Chinese perspective Africa provided a mixture of 
resources, potential new markets and an international friend at a time when China 
needed all three.  When considering the historical context behind China‟s 
involvement in Africa, it is evident that China‟s presence in Africa today has longer 
and deeper roots, and needs to be understood as an ongoing process (Brautigam, 
2009: 78). 
Today China and Africa are more politically and economically involved than ever 
before. This is evident when considering what a significant trade partner China is for 
African states. China is Africa‟s largest trading partner, surpassing the United States 
and traditional European partners as of 2011 (BBC, 22 May 2012). With this 
increased economic interaction, conferences such as FOCAC have become 
necessary to provide China and African states with a platform through which to 
discuss their growing political and economic engagement.  
 
2.4 THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (FOCAC) AND CADFUND 
FOCAC was formed in 2000 and was as a result of China‟s strategic foreign policy 
towards Africa, aimed at securing China‟s economic and diplomatic interests 
(Grimm, 2012: 1). The first ministerial meeting of FOCAC was held in Beijing in 
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October 2000. More than 80 ministers from 44 African countries and China, 
representatives of 17 regional and international organizations, people from the 
business communities of China and Africa were invited to the conference (FOCAC, 
2011: 1). The Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was convened in Addis 
Ababa, capital of Ethiopia during December 2003. The Third FOCAC meeting was 
held in Beijing in November 2006. 2006 was referred to as China‟s “Year of Africa” 
by Chinese officials and in the beginning of 2006 the Chinese government released 
its first white paper on Africa titled China‟s Africa Policy (Grimm, 2012: 2). Chinese 
and African representatives met in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt during November 2009 
for the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial meeting. After each of the four conferences action 
plans were drawn up outlining how the various goals and objectives discussed at 
each conference would be reached within the time period precluding the next 
FOCAC meeting (FOCAC, 2011: 1). 
 
The latest FOCAC meeting was held in Beijing during July 2012.  The Beijing Action 
Plan (2013-2015) was yielded. The Action Plan highlighted the need for increased 
cooperation regarding people to people exchanges between China and African 
countries and emphasised a commitment to furthering African integration (Liu, 2012: 
1). Five priority areas were decided on at the Fifth FOCAC meeting, these areas are 
identified sectors in African countries which need development and where Chinese 
investment will be focused. These areas are namely, manufacturing, agriculture, 
infrastructure and small and medium enterprises (Ghana Business News, 2012: 1). 
The theme for the Fifth Ministerial FOCAC was “build on past achievement and open 
up new prospects for new type of China-Africa strategic partnership (FOCAC, 2012: 
1).   
 
FOCAC is an important component of China-Africa relations and has become a 
platform through which economic and political ties between African states and China 
are strengthened. The Forum also reflects the fundamentally bilateral way in which 
China-Africa relations are often conducted. Although representatives from regional 
African and Chinese bodies as well as leaders in the business community are invited 
to FOCAC, it is government-to-government deals which dominate the gathering 
(FOCAC, 2012; Grimm 2012). 
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During the FOCAC Beijing Summit of 2006 it was announced that the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADFund) would be formed. The Fund was established with the 
purpose of encouraging investment by Chinese companies in African countries (Zhu, 
2010: 1). The initial US$1 billion was funded by China Development Bank, this 
amount is set to ultimately increase to US$ 5 billion (Zhu, 2010: 1). CADFund forms 
part of the eight measures announced by President Hu Jintao at the 2006 FOCAC 
summit. The eight measures were set forth as part of a commitment by the Chinese 
government to support African development (see table 1).   
 
Table 1: China’s Eight-Point Proposal Supporting African Development 
 
At the Fourth Conference of Chinese and African entrepreneurs held Beijing during 
July 2012 CADFund, after receiving an additional US$ 2 billion, committed to 
investing this amount in 60 Sino-African projects across 30 African countries (People 
Daily, 2012). According to the FOCAC website the Fund is to help facilitate projects 
by Chinese enterprises in Africa that will “contribute to local technological progress, 
employment opportunities and sustainable socio-economic development” (FOCAC, 
2011: 1).  
The first branch of the China-Africa Development Fund, the head office of the 
organisation is in Beijing, was opened in Johannesburg in March 2009 with the next 
opening in March 2010 in Addis Ababa, a third and fourths offices have been opened 
 
1. Double the 2006 level of assistance by 2009 
2. Provide US$5 billion in preferential loans and credits within the next three years 
3. Provide US$5 billion to support Chinese companies to invest in Africa 
4. Construct a conference centre for the African Union 
5. Cancel debt owed by heavily-indebted poor countries 
6. Increase zero-tariff export items to China from 190 to over 440 from the least developed 
countries 
7. Set up additional Sino-African trade and economic zones 
8. Send Chinese experts to Africa and train African professionals in areas of agriculture, 
health, education, science and technology 
 
Source: FOCAC website http://www.focac.org/eng/jlydh/sjzs/t715195.htm 
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in Lusaka in and in Accra in 2011.1  Each branch provides advisory services and 
funding to Chinese enterprises operating in their region. The Zambian branch 
oversees most of the Southern African investments, lifting some of the burden off the 
South African office which reportedly oversees investments from all over the 
continent (Zambia Weekly, 2011: 5). Representatives of CADFund have stipulated 
that one of the Fund‟s goals is to better cooperation with the African Union (AU) 
which is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Minney, 2010: 1). This could be a 
contributing factor as to why an office was opened in Addis Ababa as opposed to 
other countries in the horn of Africa region such as Sudan or Kenya. 
As part of the research process for this thesis, an interview was conducted with Mr Li 
Shenglin, the Project Manager of CADFund Johannesburg Office. One of the 
questions Mr Li was asked was how he thought the establishment of CADFund fitted 
into the aims of China‟s Africa Policy, Mr. Li stated that CADFund was a pioneering 
move in the process of mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa, it 
remedied the gap under the traditional model of free aid and loans. He asserted that 
CADFund remedies this gap without increasing the debt burden to African countries, 
through a market-oriented operation aimed at achieve the sustained and healthy 
self–development of African states.2 To which end CADFund has truly done this is 
difficult to determine. Clearly, however, CADFund is becoming increasingly active in 
African states and is involved with numerous projects across the continent, as will be 
discussed in greater depth in chapter five of this thesis. 
 
The CADFund website reveals little about the projects that the Fund is involved or 
has been involved in. The heading “project overview” on CADFund‟s website lists 
areas of activities, namely: agriculture, manufacturing, industrial, infrastructure and 
natural resources. There is, however, no detailed information about projects 
contained under the listed headings (CADFund, 2011). Finding the exact number of 
and information about the various projects which CADFund is involved has proved to 
be a difficult task. News reports discussing CADFund‟s involvement in specific 
projects have been consulted in order to determine what kinds of projects CADFund 
                                            
1
Interview with Mr Li Shenglin, (Project Manager of CADFund Johannesburg Office) on 7 September 
2011. 
2
 Ibid 
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is involved in.  According to Mr Li CADFund has over the past four years been 
involved in roughly 60 projects and undertaken a number of joint-ventures with 
various Chinese and African companies.3 The Fund is still a relatively new 
organisation and component of China-Africa relations and as such few academic 
sources exist regarding the Fund and its projects in Africa. Lack of information by 
CADFund regarding its projects in Africa is one criticism which can be levelled 
against the Fund. 
 
2.5 CHINA’S AFRICA POLICY IN CONTEXT OF ITS GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 
In January 2006, only months before FOCAC II, the Chinese government released 
its first white paper on Africa titled China‟s Africa Policy. The paper consists of six 
sections which each deal with a specific area of interest namely; 
  
 “Africa‟s position and role”,  
 “China‟s relation‟s with Africa”,   
 “China‟s Africa policy”,  
 “enhancing all-round cooperation between China and Africa”,  
 “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and is follow-up actions” and finally 
  “China‟s relations with African regional organizations” (FMPRC, 2006: 1-12) 
 
The paper highlights the growing importance of African countries in international 
relations and reiterates the claim that China and Africa have shared historical 
experiences and shared current interests (FMPRC, 2006: 1-12).   
The principles upon which the Chinese government claims to base its engagement 
with African states are outlined in part three. These principles are as follows: 
sincerity, friendship and equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity, 
mutual support and close coordination and learning from each other and seeking 
common development. Part three of the policy emphasises the fact that adherence 
to the One China policy is the political foundation upon which all relations between 
China and African countries are built. The paper states that  
                                            
3
 Interview with Mr Li Shenglin, (Project Manager of CADFund Johannesburg Office) on 7 September 
2011. 
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“the Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of African countries abide by the One China principle, refuse to have official 
relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's call for reunification. 
China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with 
countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis 
of the one China principle” (FMPRC, 2006: 3).  
The adherence to the One China Policy as a prerequisite for African states 
establishing economic and political relations with China, dispels the notion set forth 
by Chinese officials that China‟s political relations with African countries is based on 
the principle of no strings-attached. 
In part four of China‟s Africa Policy, guidelines for enhancing China and Africa‟s 
cooperation, in the political, economic, educational, cultural and social field as well 
as in the field of peace and security, are laid out.  Under the heading “the economic 
field” it states that “the Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese 
enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide 
preferential loans and buyer credits to this end” (FMPRC, 2006: 5). It also states that 
“African countries are welcome to make investment in China”, it is unclear, however, 
whether the Chinese government offers any support for African enterprises operating 
in China (FMPRC, 2006: 5). The China-Africa Development Fund is an example of 
an institution which provides support for Chinese enterprises wishing to operate in 
African states. African enterprises wishing to receive support from the Fund for their 
projects in Africa are required to find a Chinese enterprise as a partner (CADFund, 
2011).  
The principle of solidarity is a prominent theme in China‟s Africa Policy. In practice 
we see that in multilateral platforms such as the United Nations (UN) and the WTO 
the Chinese government has in various instance shown a shared agenda with that of 
other developing countries (Eisenman et al, 2007: xv). In the Fifth FOCAC Ministerial 
Declaration, both African and Chinese ministerial officials called for changes to be 
made in the international system and a reform of the UN in particular the United 
Nation‟s Security Council, calling for a larger representation of African countries in 
the Security Council as well as other UN agencies (FOCAC, 2012). 
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The advancement of the WTO Doha Round was also emphasised in the latest 
FOCAC declaration (FOCAC, 2012: 1). “The Doha Round is the latest round of trade 
negotiations among the WTO membership. Its aim is to achieve major reform of the 
international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and 
revised trade rules. The work programme covers about 20 areas of trade” (WTO, 
2012: 1). The Round is in a deadlock and this has a major impact of Africa countries 
who are large traders in primary goods, the subsidising of agriculture in countries in 
Europe for instance has a major impact on African countries who are trying to 
compete internationally. The Doha Round discusses matters such as farming 
subsidies and aims to make international trade fairer; the advancement of these talks 
is of importance to many developing countries including China (Eisenman et al, 
2007: xv).  
China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Having a permanent seat at the UNSC provides China with a veto power, meaning 
that China‟s government can halt any proposals which do not coincide with its 
foreign policy objectives. The Chinese government has been criticised for its 
relations with so-called “rogue states” such as Sudan (now Sudan and South Sudan) 
and Zimbabwe. During the Darfur crisis China vetoed resolutions calling for UN 
intervention in Sudan. After growing international pressure ,not least threatening the 
successful conduct of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China was eventually 
instrumental in convincing President Omar Al Bashir to allow UN and African Union 
(AU) peacekeeping troops into Darfur and Sudan in 2007 (Harniet-Sievers et al, 
2010: 186-188). More recently China‟s decision to veto resolutions such as those to 
impose sanctions on Syria in 2012 for example caused major controversy and 
criticism from France, the UK and the USA who all supported the resolution (BBC, 19 
July 2012). China in many ways has positioned itself as a force for multipolarity, 
which, in effect, means that it works against Western dominance. China seems to 
use its veto power, along with Russia, in UNSC to act as a counterbalance to the 
remaining three Western states.  
 
The Chinese government attributes the highest importance to a strict understanding 
of the country‟s sovereignty. Non-interference in what is deemed „internal affairs‟ is a 
vital international principle, one which it upholds fervently in forums such as the 
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UNSC. For African governments, sovereignty is also an important element of 
international relations, in a number of cases serving as a protection for authoritarian 
regimes and autocratic leaders. (Zhongqi, 2010: 227).  The fact that the Chinese 
government itself has been subject to international criticism regarding human rights 
abuses and China‟s authoritarian political system indicates that China has vested 
interested in emphasising the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention by 
outside forces in the internal affairs of a state. It is this very principle which shields 
China‟s regime from intervention by outside forces in its internal matters.   
  
2.6 CONCLUSION  
China is not a unitary actor and should not be seen as such. While the Chinese 
government sets out its foreign policy towards Africa with the aim of achieving 
certain objectives, the implementation involves numerous institutions and also non-
state actors. Even though China‟s political system is authoritarian, the control the 
Chinese state has over enterprises and institutions operating in Africa is at times 
exaggerated; rivalries exist between the aims of Chinese enterprise coming to Africa 
and the aims of the Chinese government (Taylor, 2009: 161).  
In order to understand the complexities of China-Africa relations it is necessary to 
understand the historical context of these relations. China and Africa have a long 
history of engagement and their relations have gone through periods of intense 
interaction and periods of relative neglect. Since the beginning of the 21st century, 
Chinese actors have become a major force of influence in many African countries 
and offer Africa leaders alternative political and economic partners to that of 
traditional Western state partners (Taylor, 2009: 23).  
China‟s Africa Policy sets out the principles which guide the Chinese government‟s 
foreign policy toward Africa states. China‟s Africa Policy states that “China attaches 
great importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 
strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and 
Africa” (FMPRC, 2006). In practice China‟s foreign policy objectives are implemented 
using a range of diplomatic and economic instruments, FOCAC (and within this 
framework: CADFund) are examples of instruments which the Chinese government 
uses in promoting economic and diplomatic ties with Africa countries.   
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Under the section “enhancing all-round cooperation between China and Africa” 
China‟s Africa Policy highlights areas of cooperation in the political and economic 
field. It is for this reason that the two next chapters will discuss the economic and 
political motivations behind China‟s engagement with African states, in order to have 
better understanding of China and Africa‟s economic and political ties. In the 
concluding chapter how CADFund fits into these political and economic ties wills be 
discussed as well as how it fits into China‟s Africa Policy.   
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CHAPTER 3: CHINA’s ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES  
3 .1 INTRODUCTION 
Resource extraction and trade have generated the largest amount of literature with 
regards to China‟s engagement with Africa (Large, 2008: 46). Resource extraction in 
general is given as the main motivating reason behind Chinese involvement in Africa 
(Alden and Alves, 2009; Butts and Bankus, 2009) This assumption oversimplifies 
China-Africa relations to a relationship which is of a largely exploitative nature and 
does not take into account other motivating factors such as political and diplomatic 
factors which play a role in China‟s interest in Africa and vice versa (Large, 2008: 
55). Indeed economic interests are behind many of China‟s activities in African 
states and therefore are an important element in China-Africa relations. It is, 
therefore, necessary to analyse China‟s economic motivations for strengthening ties 
with African states.  
Alden asserts that contrary to popular discourse China and Africa have in reality had 
relative brief interactions before now. In his book China in Africa, Alden seeks to find, 
among others, the reason behind the “dramatic change in ties between two regions” 
(Alden, 2007: 3).  He notes that one of the main reasons behind this dramatic 
increase in interaction is China‟s growing need for access to natural resources and 
energy (Alden, 2007: 4).     
China‟s growing economic engagement with Africa has brought with it issues such 
as low labour standards by Chinese enterprises, Chinese companies‟ disregard for 
the environment and cheap imports, which have flooded African markets leaving 
many local producers unemployed (Alden, 2007: 4). The following chapter will look at 
China‟s economic interest in Africa and focus in on investment, trade, resource 
extraction and the search for new markets as motivating reasons for China‟s interest 
in Africa.   
3.2 TRADE – GROWING BUT IMBALANCED 
The discussion on China-Africa trade relations and relations in general, needs to be 
contextualised. As scholar Lucy Corkin points out, the Chinese government‟s 
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increased outreach to Africa is only one component of China‟s growing global 
integration (Corkin, 2011: 61). This international integration is a culmination of the 
Chinese government‟s “going global” (走出去, zouchuqu) policy which was initiated 
as part of Deng Xiaoping‟s socialist modernisation scheme in the 1980s (Brautigam, 
2009: 74). 
The impressive levels of growth in trade and investment which we see between 
China and Africa can also be seen with China and other regions of the world such as 
South America. The African continent captures only a fraction of China‟s total global 
trade (4.2 %) and investment (2.7%) (Corkin, 2011: 61). It is important to bear this in 
mind when analysing China-Africa relations, in order to avoid exaggerating the 
overall importance of Africa to China. China‟s involvement in Africa has received a 
disproportionally large amount of scrutiny and criticism and this has meant that 
certain prejudice about relations between the two has at times inhibited thorough 
unbiased research.  
In 2010 the Chinese government released a white paper titled “China-Africa 
Economic and Trade Cooperation” (FMPRC, 2010). This paper details the Chinese 
government‟s desire to continue and increase trade between China and Africa. The 
paper also, to an extent, acknowledges trade imbalances between China and Africa 
but mainly focuses on positive developments between China and Africa. It speaks of 
promoting balanced development of trade between China and Africa, according to 
the paper “China-Africa bilateral trade volume was only US$12.14 million in 1950, it 
rose to US$100 million in 1960, and exceeded US$1 billion in 1980” in 2000 trade 
reached the US$10 billion mark in 2000” and in 2008, China-Africa “bilateral trade 
volume exceeded US$100 billion” (FMPRC, 2010). In 2009, even though trade 
volume dropped to US$91.07 billion, mainly as a result of the international financial 
crisis, China still became Africa's largest trade partner that year for the first time 
(FMPRC, 2010). It is easy to get caught up in theses impressive figures, but it is 
important to also evaluate the negative impacts which Chinese imports have had in 
Africa. 
There are only a handful of countries which enjoy a trade surplus with China. Angola 
is one such example. In April 2008 Angola was China‟s top crude oil supplier, ahead 
of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia (Bloomberg, 2008). When natural resources such 
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as oil and natural gas are excluded from trade figures, it is clear that China exports 
far more to Africa than it imports from them. African countries are the recipients of a 
large amount of Chinese exports such as textiles and electronic goods. The effect of 
these imports from China on African states has been profound. It has led to the 
closing down of many local businesses and damaged local industries such as the 
textile industry in South Africa for example (Le Pere and Shelton, 2007: 27). The 
influx of large quantities of cheap textiles to countries like South Africa, have put 
many local manufacturers out of business. An abundance of labour, lower wages 
and superior manufacturing capabilities have all contributed to Chinese producers 
being able to produce and export products in larger quantities at a far lower cost than 
local manufacturers are able to (Le Pere and Shelton, 2007: 27).   
 
China exports a range of goods to African countries including machinery, electronics, 
technology, textiles and various other manufactured goods. In turn, China imports 
mainly raw materials from African countries such as copper from Zambia, platinum 
from Zimbabwe and oil from Sudan (Taylor, 2009: 18). Although African exports to 
China are increasing, the trade balance is still tipped in favour of China (Botha, 2006: 
36). The fact that African countries rely heavily on exporting primary goods means 
that they are more vulnerable to market volatility. Fluctuations in commodity prices 
have an immediate and extreme effect on African countries because they rely on 
commodity goods for export income. Africa boasts a significant share of mineral 
resources relative to the world‟s reserves. The paradox of Africa‟s resource wealth 
and massive poverty of its inhabitants has given rise to the Resource Curse Theory 
(Edoho, 2011: 114). This theory asserts that the richer a country is in natural 
resources and the more it relies on these resources to support its economy, the 
more vulnerable and unstable the economy. This is because commodity prices are 
volatile and fluctuations will have a tremendous impact on economy. Reliance on 
one primary product has also hinders the development of other sectors in African 
states and has led to fighting over access to resources causing instability and 
nurturing corruption in resource rich states. 
Africa does have an important role to play in China‟s economic growth and vice 
versa. China‟s expansive manufacturing base, rising middle class and growing 
urbanisation has increased its demand for raw materials of which African states can 
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offer (Botha, 2006: 34). Chinese producers also need a market for their exports and 
Africa offers a large consumer market base. Africa is in need of capital investment 
and infrastructure development. African countries are heavily reliant on the 
importation of manufactured products, due to the fact that the manufacturing sector 
of African countries is undeveloped. If directed to the correct areas Chinese 
investment could benefit undeveloped sectors such as the manufacturing sector and 
service industry in African states (Botha, 2006: 34).  
One positive effect which Chinese imports have had in African states is that the 
availability of low-cost products has meant that for the first time many Africans are 
able to afford electronic goods such computers, radios and various kitchen 
appliances (Brautigam, 2009: 77). This has led to a rise in the living standards for 
numerous locals. Infrastructure development is another positive outcome of Africa‟s 
involvement with China. Chinese construction companies are constructing mobile 
telephone networks, railways and roads, improving infrastructure and accessibility in 
African states (Brautigam, 2009:77).  A large number of construction companies 
operating in Africa are Chinese SOEs and in exchange for infrastructure the Chinese 
government receives access to Africa‟s natural resources (Brautigam, 2009:77).  
 
Graph 1: China and Africa’s trade (1995-2010) 
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When looking at the above graph (graph 1) it is evident that trade between China 
and Africa has grown tremendously from 1995 to 2012. If natural resources are 
removed from these figures, as stated for the example of Angola above, then we see 
that the trade is skewed in favour of China (Rotberg, 2008: 9).  
 
3.3 INVESTMENT – CHINESE ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE CONTINENT 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a major component of Chinese economic 
cooperation with Africa.  According to the figure below (figure 1), originally from 
Heritage foundation, a conservative American think-tank, Sub-Saharan Africa was 
the recipient of 13.8 percent of Chinese investment abroad (The Economist, 20 April 
2011: 1).   
 
Figure 1: China’s FDI (2005-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Economist website http://www.economist.com/node/18586448 
 
At the end of 2006, Chinese investment in Africa had reached US$11.7 billion and 
over 800 Chinese companies are said to be operating in Africa, engaged in various 
fields such as trade, manufacturing, natural resource exploitation, transport and 
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agriculture (He, 2009: 152). Not all investment is supported directly by the Chinese 
central government; there is also an emerging dynamic of regional investment from 
lower levels of Chinese government including the provincial level and private 
entrepreneurial investment is also increasingly prevalent (Alden et al, 2009: 14). The 
figure below (Figure 2) depicts which Chinese actors are involved in FDI allocation.   
 
Figure 2: Chinese FDI in context 
 
Source: Report from Centre for Chinese Studies website. Van der Lugt et al. 2011: “Assessing 
China‟s Role in Foreign Direct Investment in Southern Africa”  
Chinese investment has largely been concentrated in resource-rich countries in 
Africa, but there has been an increase in the level business activity across the 
continent, even in countries such as Sierra Leone with relatively untapped markets 
(Parenti, 2009: 118). Due to increased levels of investment by Chinese enterprises in 
African states, the Chinese government has established Chinese Trade Centres in 
across Africa to these enterprises. These Trade Centres assist by providing 
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information to Chinese businesses, operating in African states, regarding investing 
and trading and also provide a degree of logistical support for starting up 
businesses. CADFund is an example of such a centre and was established with the 
aim of encouraging and assisting Chinese investment in Africa (Alden et al, 2009: 
14). 
  
Most African countries depend almost exclusively on one or a few raw materials for 
their export income which, as explained earlier in this chapter, can be a risky 
strategy. Nigeria for example receives almost 90 percent of its foreign exchange 
from the export of crude oil (Edoho, 2011: 114). Sierra Leone relies of diamond 
exports for more than 60 percent of its export income and Zambia now depends 
heavily on copper exports, mainly to China, for its income (Edoho, 2011: 114). 
Relying so heavily on primary goods means that resource rich African countries are 
vulnerable to the volatility of commodity prices (Edoho, 2011: 104).  
Figure 3: Distribution of China's Direct Investment in African Industries (by the 
end of 2009) 
 
 
Source: Chinese Governments official web portal:  http://english.gov.cn/official/2010-
12/23/content_1771603_3.htm 
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The figure above (figure 3) is found in the China-Africa Economic and Trade 
Cooperation document and indicates the distribution of China‟s FDI according to 
which African industries the investment was made. According to this 22 percent of 
Chinese investment in African countries has been in the manufacturing sector 
(FMPRC, 2010). Increased investment in the manufacturing sector is vital for the 
diversification of African economies and if correct these investment percentages 
could have a positive effect on developing and diversifying African economies.   
Skills development is an essential part of allowing African countries to move away 
from exporting only primary goods such as minerals and agricultural products. China 
has to date been instrumental in allowing many African countries to improve their 
infrastructure by improving road and railway networks for instance. If African 
countries can direct investment towards education and skills development as well as 
factory building then this would certainly help them to develop the secondary and 
tertiary sectors of their economies (Edoho, 2011: 105). 
 
3.4 THE QUEST FOR RESOURCES AND NEW MARKETS 
Since 1978 the Chinese government has focused on China‟s economic 
development. From 1990s, it became necessary for the Chinese economy to acquire 
international resource supplies including energy (Alden et al, 2009: 7). The need for 
resources drew China closer to Africa and raw material acquisition is now policy 
imperative for the Chinese government. Chinese enterprises have not been allowed 
access to a large portion of the Middle East‟s oil supplies because of the dominance 
of mainly American oil companies in Middle Eastern states. This has led the Chinese 
government to look for alternatives, such as oil rich countries in Africa to help fulfil 
their growing energy requirements (Alden et al, 2009:7). 
The quest for new markets for Chinese exports has also become a policy imperative 
for the Chinese government. African markets have displayed strong commercial 
potential for Chinese businesses. The Chinese government, Chinese entrepreneurs 
and businesses regard Africa as a continent with growing economic potential in the 
form of relatively untapped and a growing consumer base (Alden et al, 2009: 7) 
Chinese enterprises in many cases receive support from the central government 
when investing in Africa and as such are not as burdened with investment 
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constraints or concerns about political instability which affect other foreign investors. 
This support has been a key factor in directing Chinese foreign direct investment to 
Africa. Africa has become a place for Chinese companies to gain experience as well 
as establish and expand their business ventures internationally (Alden et al, 2009: 
7). 
  
3.5 AFRICA’S TASK: MAKING THE MOST OF IT 
The level of Chinese investment and trade in Africa makes China a key partner for 
African states. China is Africa‟s largest trading partner and is a vital source of 
investment for African states. The last few decades have seen going from a relatively 
small actor in Africa to arguably the most important international partner for many 
African countries. (Edoho, 2011: 104). 
Trade between China and Africa surpassed US$120 billion in 2011 and in the past 
two years China has given more loans to poor countries, mainly in Africa, than the 
World Bank. Chinese competition, however, in African countries has caused damage 
to local suppliers. Hundreds of textile factories across Nigeria collapsed in recent 
years because they could not compete with cheap Chinese garments, this has 
meant that many thousands of jobs were lost (The Economist, 20 April 2011: 2).  
Many Africans have expressed concern when it comes to China‟s presence in their 
country. Inferior working conditions in Chinese owned mining companies have 
become a contentious issue in countries like Zambia. Zambian President Michael 
Sata, made Sino-scepticism his trademark campaigning tool.  And there are cases of 
other opposition parties, especially in southern Africa, building their campaigns on 
anti-China platforms. Every country south of Rwanda has had acrimonious debate 
about Chinese “exploitation” (van Bracht, 2011: 1).  
Chinese companies in many instances bring over their own labour but as a by-
product local employment is create. Chinese companies need local African workers 
to provide auxiliary services such as cleaning and translators for example (Alden et 
al, 2009: 14). Chinese goods may have damaged local industry but it has also lead 
to an improved standard of living for the average African consumer, who can now 
afford Chinese electronics and textiles (Alden et al, 2009:14). On a state to state 
level Chinese and African government deals have led to increased infrastructure 
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development with the building of roads, railways, schools, clinics, stadiums and 
hospitals in exchange for resource agreements. Understanding China‟s economic 
impact in Africa is difficult as it is a very dynamic and complex relationship which has 
positive and negative aspects. It is the way in which each facet of the engagement is 
dealt with which will determine its consequences (Brautigam, 2009: 77). 
 
In order to benefit from Chinese growing economic engagement with African states,   
leaders must direct Chinese investment into developing local manufacturing 
industries and make use of the opportunity to access to technology and skills from 
Chinese enterprises. China can offer a viable alternative to Western investment if it 
is used in the correct manner. It is recommended that African leaders develop 
policies which protect local industries and which insist upon local employment by 
Chinese businesses operating in their state (Brautigam, 2009: 77). 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION  
China and Africa‟s economic engagement have grown substantially in recent years. 
Although China‟s is the African continent‟s largest trading partner. China imports 
mainly natural resources such as copper and oil from Africa while African states 
import manufactured products from China. African countries are the recipient of a 
large variety and amount of electronic products and textiles exports from China and 
that these Chinese exports flood African markets and put local traders out of 
business. Reliance on primary commodity exports has meant that other sectors of 
African state‟s economies have remained underdeveloped.  
In order to develop Africa‟s secondary and tertiary sectors, foreign investment needs 
to be directed into developing the correct industries. A significant portion of Chinese 
investment has reportedly been in the manufacturing sector and this offers African 
states the opportunity to develop this sector if investment continues and is utilised 
effectively.  
An institution like CADFund promotes increased economic ties between China and 
Africa by encouraging and facilitating Chinese investment in African countries. In 
order to gain a great understanding of China‟s growing ties with Africa states it is 
necessary to take into considerations both the economic and political elements of 
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this engagement. The presence of such an institution in African states is also an 
indication of China‟s growing political engagement with African countries. CADFund 
was formed as part of the commitments made by the Chinese government at the 
2006 FOCAC, FOCAC is a meeting of government officials and is an important 
diplomatic platform through which China-Africa relations are intensified. As part of 
FOCAC‟s outcomes CADFund serves a diplomatic purpose and represents part of 
the Chinese government foreign policy toward African states. China‟s interest in 
African states has moved beyond the need for resources and encompasses a range 
of political considerations as well. These political motivations will be examined 
further in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR CHINA’S 
INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
China‟s involvement with African countries is often described as Chinese businesses 
and the Chinese government pursuing resources and markets, but, as argued 
above, there is also a strong political element which motivates the Chinese 
government‟s interest in African states. The Chinese government has initiated and  
with the help of SOEs completed numerous projects all over Africa and while many 
of these projects have been concentrated in resource rich states, China is becoming 
increasingly involved in states such Ethiopia which do not offer an abundance of 
natural resources. Before the 1990s China‟s involvement in Africa was more 
politically motivated than economically motivated (Brautigam, 2009: 76). Today 
China-Africa relations have a strong political and economic element to them.  This 
chapter will focus on the political motivations behind China‟s involvement with Africa.  
Internationally criticism has been levelled against the Chinese government regarding 
its handling of the Tibet struggle for greater independence from the central 
government and the issue of an international recognition of Taiwan. Allegations of 
human rights abuses have also tainted China‟s image internationally (Brautigam, 
2009: 76). Most criticism toward China comes from Western states which view China 
as authoritarian state which despite robust economic growth in recent years, still has 
to undergo politically reforms if it is to be accepted as a responsible world power.  
In international forums such UN General Assembly decisions are based on one-
country-one-vote, the number of allies which a state has, becomes important (Botha, 
2006: 65). China‟s UN representatives rely on African states‟ support in order to 
block undesired proposals such the acknowledgement of Taiwan as a sovereign 
state. This need for friends in the international community is one of the motivations 
for China‟s increased involvement in Africa (Botha, 2006: 65). 
China has positioned itself as a potential leader of “the global south” (i.e. of 
developing countries) (FOCAC, 2011: 1). China‟s involvement with African countries 
helps portray an image of China as a leader and partner to developing countries. As 
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a part of this positioning, the concept of South-South Cooperation has become 
increasingly prevalent in discussions on international relations (DIE, 2007: 2) The 
debate surrounding intensified cooperation between countries of the developing 
global south have been led by countries such China, Brazil and India, as well as 
smaller actors like Colombia or South Africa. China and Africa‟s relations are one 
(prominent) example of South-South Cooperation (DIE, 2007: 2). 
The notion of a China model for economic development is one which has received 
attention in both media and academic circles. Most Chinese actors do not recognise 
the existence of a “China-model” and have not tried to advocate such a model for 
development in Africa (Grimm, 2011: 30). For African leaders such as President 
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe the notion that such a model exists is an alluring one 
because it stands in contrast to the traditional Western model of economic 
liberalisation and political democratisation which has not been successful in many 
African states. Mugabe has propagated the “look east” policy as an alternative to 
traditional Western partners for African nations (Grimm, 2011: 30). China so far has 
managed to achieve remarkable economic growth without democratising or fully 
liberalising its economy. Whether this path of development is a sustainable one 
remains to be seen. China‟s focus on trade and investment above issues of 
governance and human rights has caused much criticism particularly from European 
countries and the USA. Learning from China‟s experiences may hold some value for 
African leaders, but it essential to remember that democratisation and economic 
liberalisation has also led to successful development for countries in Southeast Asia 
and Europe (Grimm, 2011: 30).  
 
This chapter will examine some of the main political motivations behind China‟s 
engagement in Africa. These motivations include the need for international allies, the 
advantages of South-South Cooperation. The idea of a China-Mode for development 
will also be discussed. 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO POLITICAL RELATIONS 
Modern Sino-Africa relations date back to the foundation of the People‟s Republic of 
China, a fact which is often highlighted by Chinese and African officials when 
referring to Sino-African relations today (Grimm, 2011: 12). During the 1955 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
38 
 
Bandung Conference, which was attend by 29 Asian and African countries including 
China and African states, increased economic and cultural cooperation was 
encouraged. The attending nations shared a colonial history and through the 
conference hoped to increase political and economic ties with one another as a way 
for them to rely less on relations with their respective former colonial powers 
(Uchehara, 2009: 96). It was here that the PRC forged political and economic 
relations with many African nations (Uchehara, 2009: 96). China‟s relations with 
Africa have ebbed and flowed through the years. When Mao Zedong was the 
political leader of China (1945-1976), Chinese involvement in Africa was largely 
ideologically motivated (Alden et al, 2009: 11).  
During 1962-1964 when then Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa, he proposed the 
“five principles of peaceful coexistence”. These principles were to govern China‟s 
relations with African (Li, 2007: 70). These principles are namely;  
 mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,  
 mutual non-aggression,  
 mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,  
 equality and mutual benefit, and  
 peaceful co-existence.  
In the wake of a wave of decolonisation in Africa, these principles were set forth by 
the Chinese government as a way for African nations and China to co-exist in a 
peaceful manner (Li, 2007: 70). The five principles are often referred to in Chinese 
policy documents and have become part of the Chinese government‟s arsenal of 
diplomatic rhetoric used when discussing Sino-African relations. 
During the 1970s, the PRC‟s foreign policy was driven by perceived ideological anti-
imperialist affinities. It was during this time that China sent technicians to nominally 
leftist African states to provide military training and modest economic aid during the 
liberation wars (Aning and Lecoutre, 2008: 40). This history of support for the plight 
of African liberation movements is something which is also often quoted by both 
Chinese and African actors when referring to their historical ties.  
In the 1980s attention receded as the Chinese government was focusing its own 
internal development efforts. After the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, African 
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countries provided support in a time when the Chinese government was being 
criticised by many countries for the killing of protesters and was being pressurised 
internationally to free its media and allow greater political freedom for its people 
(Taylor, 2009: 13). During this time many African countries were also being 
pressured by western powers to reform politically and economically (Owen and 
Melville, 2005: 1). This in part led to China and African states renewing their 
relations. Throughout the 1990s the Chinese government increased aid to the 
continent and resumed earlier rhetoric of “mutual respect” and “concern for diversity” 
which had previously characterised China‟s engagement with the continent (Owen 
and Melville, 2005: 1).  
African states have since remained important in China‟s foreign policy agenda.  It is 
clear that the Chinese government has many objectives motivating its involvement in 
African countries, not least of which involve the acquisition of resources (Swan, 
2008: 1). 
 
4.3 THE RELEVANCE OF THE ‘ONE CHINA’ POLICY 
The issue of the One China Policy is key foreign policy issues for China. Adherence 
to the One China Policy is a non-negotiable precondition for African countries 
wishing to engage politically with the PRC (Sautman and Yan, 2007: 78).  There are 
only four remaining African states which officially recognize Taiwan, they are Burkina 
Faso, The Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland. In August 2006 Chad 
relinquished its ties with Taiwan and chose to forge relations with China instead, this 
was a major setback for Taiwan as Chad was the only African state, which held real 
potential in terms of resources (Alden et al, 2009: 9). The fact that China has such a 
stronghold in Africa means that Beijing has become less concerned about the 
remaining Taiwan-recognising states in Africa and in 2006 even invited the five 
states to attend FOCAC 3 as observers, presumably also as part of a larger strategy 
to tempt these states to sever ties with Taiwan (Alden et al, 2009: 9).  
In 2006 trade between Taiwan and its five African trading partners reached just over 
US$56 million and for Taiwan, Africa represents a fairly small proportion of its foreign 
trade (Large, 2008). Despite the dominance of Chinese actors in Africa, Taiwan 
continues to promote itself in Africa and in 2007 the first Taiwan Heads of State 
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Summit was held in Taipei. The gathering saw the five Taiwan-recognising African 
states meet to discuss five core areas which were; information and communication, 
economic development, medical assistance, the environment and peace and 
security. The summit was structured similarly to that of FOCAC and saw an Action 
Plan and Follow-Up Committee being established (Alden et al, 2009: 9). Taiwan‟s 
quest to gain the support of African states can be interpreted as having less to do 
with economic interests and more to do with political ones.  
Since 1971, with the change to Mainland China as the sole representation of China, 
Taiwan has not been a member of the United Nations and has been lobbying for 
readmission to the organisation for a number of years.  In order to be readmitted 
Taiwan would need support from a large number of states. In September 2007, 
however, the UN General Assembly‟s General Committee decided not to place the 
issue of Taiwan‟s admission to the UN on the agenda, which meant that the re-
admission of Taiwan was not even discussed (Alden et al, 2009: 11). With regards to 
issues such as Taiwan‟s re-admission into the UN, the Chinese government, as 
previously discussed relies on its allies for support in keeping the issue off the 
agenda of the UN General Assembly (Sautman and Yan, 2007: 78).  
 
4.4 SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AS A CENTRAL THEME 
The Chinese government has portrayed itself in many ways as a kind of leader of the 
global south and champions a new international political and economic order which 
is based on equality, sovereignty, mutual benefit and one which safe guards the 
interests of the developing world (Alden et al, 2009: 7). The Chinese foreign agenda 
forms part of its effort to foster cooperation among the developing world and 
demonstrate its status as a leading power (Uchehara, 2009: 96). The Chinese 
rhetoric of protecting the rights and interests of the developing world was echoed in 
China‟s Africa Policy which states that China hopes for a new world order based on 
rationality and justice which will see the global South play a much more important 
role (FMPRC, 2006). 
In November 2010 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and China 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for strengthened South-South Cooperation. 
According to UNDP Highlights of 2011, the UNDP and China piloted a trilateral 
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cooperation project aimed at identifying a developing country with a need for aid and 
starting a project with the UNDP, China and the selected developing country (UNDP, 
2012).  The UNDP has previously stated that it supports the idea South-South 
Cooperation as a way for developing countries to collaborate and help with each 
other‟s respective development challenges (UNDP, 2012).  
A particular role in political projections is played by FOCAC. The forum has become 
a tool for Chinese and African officials to elevate the achievements that have been 
made between the China and Africa and set new objectives for relations between the 
two. FOCAC has also become a symbol of South-South Cooperation. Although the 
FOCAC summit focuses on economic topics it has a clear political dimension to it 
(Grimm, 2012: 1). FOCAC serves as a way for China and Africa states to make 
economic agreements as well as forge stronger diplomatic ties. FOCAC is also in 
many ways the Chinese equivalent to gathers such as Franco-African Summit and 
the Commonwealth Conference (Grimm, 2012: 1). Other emerging powers such as 
India and Turkey have also been spurred to establish high level meetings with 
African officials. Such gatherings increase South-South Cooperation between 
emerging powers and African countries (Grimm, 2012: 1). CADFund fits into this 
overall policy pattern as a tool to further South-South Cooperation. By encouraging 
Chinese enterprises to invest in African states, CADFund increases economic 
engagement between Africa and China. CADFund can also be seen as fulfilling a 
diplomatic role as it is mandated to represent the Chinese government‟s policy 
objectives, one of which is increasing economic cooperation between China and 
Africa.4  
 
4.5 ATTRACTIONS OF SUCCESS - THE ‘CHINA MODEL’ 
After setbacks in their economic development in the 1980s, many African leaders 
became disillusioned the Western model of development which advocated political 
democracy and economic liberalisation as the only viable way for newly independent 
states to develop effectively and achieve economic growth (Girouard, 2008: 1).  The 
Chinese path to economic growth has stood in contrast to this. It is unlikely that the 
Chinese government will be able to maintain high levels of economic growth with 
                                            
4
 Interview with Mr Li Shenglin, (Project Manager of CADFund Johannesburg Office) on 7 September 
2011. 
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limited political freedom (Girouard, 2008: 1). Increased protests around China hint to 
the fact that things are changing in China. Chinese citizens are demanding better 
service delivery from the government and accountability from political leaders. The 
fact that we are increasingly seeing and hearing about protests in China, in 
international media is already an indication that change has occurred in China (The 
Economist, 28 January 2012). The Chinese government has managed to achieve 
substantial economic growth with limited political freedom by focusing on its 
economy. Through economic liberalisation policies and by focusing on trade and 
investment, the Chinese government has been able to achieve high levels of 
economic growth which has perhaps quelled dissent, up until now, amongst its 
citizens (The Economist, 28 January 2012).  
Most Chinese actors deny the existence of a Chinese model for economic 
development (Grimm, 2011: 30). Yet, for African actors an alternative to the Western 
model of development is an appealing notion (Davies, 2010: 23). After numerous 
failed attempts by many African societies to democratise their political systems and 
foster economic growth, African actors are searching for an alternative development 
path. Indeed there are certain lessons which Africa states can learn from China‟s 
development strategy. One such lesson could be to follow the Chinese government 
focus on encouraging local enterprises to invest abroad by creating a favourable 
investment climate for them internationally. The Chinese government‟s corporate 
engagement strategy in Africa consists of numerous elements. Top Chinese officials 
help create a favourable investment climate in Africa through a mix of prestige 
diplomacy, economic assistance and diplomatic support for Africa leaders (Gill and 
Reilly, 2007: 37). At home in Chinese bureaucratic agencies, the Chinese 
government encourages Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to increase 
investment and trade with Africa countries. China‟s SOEs both implement China‟s 
aid programmes and extract natural resources (Gill and Reilly, 2007: 37).   
The Chinese government encourages its SOEs to seek exploration and supply 
contracts with countries rich in oil, natural gas and other resources (Parenti, 2009: 
121). This has led to a dominance of Chinese companies in the energy sector in 
countries such as Angola. Resource acquisition especially oil and gas is economic 
imperative for the Chinese government and is a major motivating factor for China‟s 
diplomatic activities in oil rich African states (Parenti, 2009: 121). The majority of 
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Chinese companies operating in Africa are involved in the building of transport 
electrical and communication infrastructure. Chinese workers provide low-cost 
expertise and manual labour. By 2006, roughly 74 000 Chinese workers were said to 
be involved in Chinese projects in Africa on a temporary basis (Gill and Reilly, 2007: 
40). Chinese enterprises tend to use Chinese workers in construction projects for 
instance and this takes away from the potential local employment element which 
would benefit many unemployed African locals. Even Chinese aid projects seldom 
make use of local labourers (Davies, 2010: 21). 
As corporate interaction between China and African countries increases, the 
Chinese government and enterprises are likely to find itself faced with the “principal-
agent” dilemma (Gill and Reilly, 2007: 37), meaning that tensions will emerge 
between the interests and aims of government principals, the bureaucracies based in 
Beijing tasked with advancing China‟s national interests and the aims of the agents 
of Chinese companies and businesspeople operating on the ground in Africa 
countries (Gill and Reilly, 2007: 37). Chinese businesses operating in Africa have 
previously received unfavourable media coverage because of allegations of poor 
working conditions, low wages and other labour disputes (The Economist, 20 April 
2011). This negative media coverage, while it might often be undifferentiated and 
oversimplified, still reflects poorly on China as a whole and damages the diplomatic 
efforts of the Chinese government in African states. 
The Chinese “model” of giving aid seems to differ from aid given by Western states 
(Grimm et al, 2011: 1). Chinese actors setting up aid projects in Africa largely use 
Chinese companies and Chinese labourers for projects. This again means that local 
workers miss out on the opportunity of employment. Chinese actors assert that in 
this way projects are finished faster because Chinese labourers are willing to work 
for less compensation and Chinese companies do not have to deal with local labour 
unions (Sautman and Yan, 2007: 78).  Chinese aid is not usually given in the form of 
monetary assistance by rather in funding for specific projects such as building 
schools or roads (Sautman and Yan, 2007: 78). Observers have noted that this 
method of giving aid has helped to curb some of the corruption which has marred 
Western aid giving the risk of African official embezzling funds directly is mitigated 
somewhat by giving aid in the form of projects.  New schools, hospitals and 
infrastructure given by the Chinese have meant that many Africans are experiencing 
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an improved standard of living (Sautman and Yan, 2007: 78). These Chinese aid 
projects in African states are also advantageous for Chinese enterprises (mainly 
SOEs) and workers who get to work on these projects. These projects also serve as 
diplomatic tool for the Chinese government and allow the government advance a 
certain image of a responsible power, in African states.     
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In Chinese foreign policy, issues such as the One Chine Policy are a foreign policy 
imperative for the Chinese government and keeping Taiwan from becoming a 
member of the UN are of vital importance. As such African states must not only 
adhere to the One China Policy in order to develop economic and political relations 
with China but they are relied on to support China in its bid to keep Taiwan from 
being admitted as a member of the UN.  
The Chinese government uses diplomatic rhetoric and aid to advance its goal of 
creating a certain kind of image on the African continent, that of a peaceful and 
responsible emerging power. The promotion of the notion South-South Cooperation 
is part of the Chinese government‟s diplomatic rhetoric. Meetings such as FOCAC 
and institutions such as CADFund are tools which are utilised to perpetuate this 
notion. Thereby, CADFund also fulfils a diplomatic purpose by encouraging 
investment by Chinese enterprises in Africa, greater economic and investment 
cooperation forms part of the Chinese government‟s foreign policy agenda in Africa. 
To conclude after analysing some of the main economic and political motivation for 
China‟s involvement in Africa in chapter three and four, chapter five will look at 
CADFund in further detail. 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
 
CHAPTER 5: CADFUND’S ROLE IN SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past five years since it began operating in 2007, CADFund has become an 
increasingly important institution in China-Africa relations. The Fund has 
representative offices in four African countries with plans to open more.5 These 
offices act as advisory services for Chinese businesses operating in African 
countries and each office is in charge of supplying funding and consulting services to 
selected African countries in their region6 CADFund has helped fund numerous 
Chinese enterprises and their respective projects in African states. The Fund acts as 
a tool for the Chinese government to encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in 
African countries. 
 
During the Fifth Conference of Chinese and African entrepreneurs held in Beijing 
during July 2012, 20 projects between Chinese and African entrepreneurs were 
signed with a reported total investment of US$341 million. During the same 
conference CADFund committed to investing US$2 billion in 60 Sino-African projects 
across 30 African countries. The China Development Bank (CDB), separately to the 
Fund, committed US$1 billion in investment for small and medium enterprises in 
Africa (Xinhua, 2012: 1). With the USA and Europe still suffering from the effects of 
the global financial crisis, China has stepped in and has taken advantage of the 
opportunities which African states have to offer. The following chapter will look at 
CADFund‟s organisational structure, investment approaches and projects in Africa.  
 
5.2 CADFUND’S SETTING AND OPERATIONS 
The China-Africa Development Fund is the subsidiary of China Development Bank, 
and is a market-oriented operating fund with 50-year duration. The Fund presents its 
operations under the rhetoric of cooperation and development (Grimm et al, 2011: 
17). CADFund aims to facilitate China-Africa cooperation and to enhance capacity 
                                            
5
 Interview with Dr Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
6
 Ibid 
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building of African economies, through direct investment and advisory services.7 
According to a senior manager in the Research and Development Department of 
CADFund in Beijing, CADFund is China's first fund that focuses on Africa 
investment, encourages and supports Chinese enterprise‟s investment in Africa. The 
Fund envisions strengthening commercial ties between China and African countries 
through its investment and advisory activities. 8  
CADFund conducts equity investment in Chinese enterprises that launch business in 
Africa. The CDB website describes CADFund‟s objective as aiming “to promote 
economic cooperation between China and Africa and advance Africa‟s economic 
development” (CDB, 2012: 1). The Fund invests directly in Chinese enterprising who 
have already set up operations in Africa or provides funding for those who are 
planning on doing so. CADFund can also be seen as a potential diplomatic tool for 
the Chinese government and according to the CDB website, “CADFund will embody 
the Chinese government‟s diplomatic and economic policies toward Africa and boost 
a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa” (CDB, 2012: 1). 
CADFund operates differently to Chinese aid in that it is operated on and based on 
market economy principles; it is solely responsible for all its profits and losses. The 
Fund‟s target group is Chinese enterprises who are active in or wish to invest in 
projects in African countries. According to the CDB website all enterprises which 
CADFund invests in must comply with laws, statutes and regulations of China and 
the recipient country which is being invested in (CDB, 2012: 1). It is unclear, 
however, what mechanisms are in place to ensure that enterprises which the Fund 
invests in adhere to these laws. If enterprises are not monitored adequately then this 
could be a potential shortcoming of the Fund as it would reflect poorly on the Fund 
and in turn the Chinese government if funded enterprises do not adhere to local and 
Chinese laws. 
Financial support from the Fund helps to resolve problem of capital shortage for 
fledgling Chinese enterprises wishing to open operations in Africa. The Fund also 
provides advisory services to Chinese enterprises, many of which lack African 
                                            
7
 Interview with Dr Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
8
 Ibid 
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investment experiences. According to one of its senior managers, CADFund 
operates rather independently and has established structures against various market 
risks. He claimed that investment decisions were made independently by the board 
of directors, guided only by CADFund‟s investment policies and procedures.9 The 
manager also asserts that based on the market principles and actual needs of 
African economies, CADFund looks into investments in areas such as agriculture, 
machinery manufacturing, infrastructure, construction materials, trade zones and 
resources development.10 It is difficult to say how the needs of a particular African 
state are   determined by CADFund. Representatives of the Fund assert that the 
Fund is required to meet annually with representatives from various Chinese 
government ministries.11 
The Fund has been operating since 2007 and since then has been involved in 
funding 60 projects around the continent and is said to have another 100 projects in 
the pipeline.12 The commitment made by CADFund representatives during the 
Fourth Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs in July 2012 to invest US$ 
2 billion in Chinese and African projects means that there is likely to be more 
CADFund supported projects in the coming year in African countries (People‟s Daily, 
2012: 1). 
 
5.2.1 Structure of organisation 
CADFund underwent an organisational “reconstructing in April 2012, the investment 
function is [now] re-organized from geographic-based departments to sector-based 
departments.”13 The four investment departments concentrate on infrastructure, 
mineral resources, agriculture and manufacturing respectively. In addition, the 
Marketing Development Department was established in 2012 to coordinate different 
investment projects and to manage CADFund‟s regional offices in Africa.14 A 
potential reason for this reorganisation could be that CADFund projects are 
                                            
9
 Interview with Dr Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
10
 Ibid 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Ibid  
14
 Ibid 
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concentrated in a limited number of African states. When asked which states 
CADFund was most active in, Dr Hao, replied that  
“investments are all made based on projects‟ market-based valuation 
regardless their country origin. Currently, over 30 African countries are 
included and projects are mainly operated in the following nations: South 
Africa, Namibia, Guinea, Egypt, Liberia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin 
and Tanzania. Among all the countries, investment in South Africa takes up 
about 20 per cent of total investment value.”15 
The Supervisory Board of CADFund consists of representatives from each of the 
following Chinese organizations: the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, 
People‟ Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Security 
Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange and China 
Development Bank. The two representatives from the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-chaired the Supervisory Board. The Office of the 
Supervisory Committee falls under the Department of Western Asian and African 
Affairs which is located within the Ministry of Commerce. The Supervisory 
Committee convenes once or twice a year, to provide CADFund with guidance from 
the policy level.16  
When looking at figure 1 below regarding the organisational structure of CADFund, it 
is evident the “stockholder” is the first in the chain of command, it is unclear whether 
in practice this is the case or whether CADFund is more accountable to the 
Supervisory Board than indicated by the figure. Representatives from the various 
ministries of the Chinese government make up the Supervisor Board, as mentioned 
above. On the figure below the Supervisory Board is located between the 
“stockholder” and “directorate”, it is unclear what this position means, whether it is 
meant to indicate that both the “directorate” and “stockholder” report to the 
Committee is difficult to verify. The CADFund website has not been updated to 
reflect the new organisational structure, which now according to Dr Hao, consists of 
                                            
15
 Interview with Dr Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
16
 Ibid 
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sector based departments and no longer geographically cased departments as 
indicated on the figure below (CADFund, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 4: Organisational structure of CADFund (this figure still represents the 
old geographically based departments and not the new sector-based 
departments) 
Source: CADFund website, 2012. “Organisational Structure” available at: 
http://www.cadfund.com/en/Article_List.aspx?columnID=85 
5.2.2 Investment approaches  
According to the CADFund and CDB website, there are four main investment 
approaches which CADFund utilises when investing in Chinese enterprises. The first 
being equity investment which is where CADFund offers support for a Chinese 
enterprise to conduct economic and trade activities and set up operations in Africa 
(CADFund, 2012) In this case CADFund will not seek a majority share in company. 
The second is quasi-equity investment, this is where CADFund may make any 
manner of investment under the auspices of Chinese state policy and that of the host 
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country. This form of investment may include preferred stock, hybrid capital 
instruments and convertible bonds (CDB, 2012) Thirdly, fund investment may be 
undertaken, in which case CADFund may invest, as a “fund of funds”, a reasonable 
proportion of its capital in other funds that invest in African countries. Lastly 
CADFund may provide knowledge investment in the form of management, consulting 
and financial advisory services to all Chinese enterprises, not limited to those being 
financed by the Fund (CDB, 2012).  
CADFund stated that it does not base funding decisions on the criterion of how many 
years an enterprise has been operating for. It may thus invest in newly established 
enterprises or in enterprises which need capital to aid expansion or enterprises 
which have been operating for a long period of time. In general, the holding period of 
CADFund investment lasts no more than 10 years. Specific duration and exit 
strategies for each project will depend on negotiation agreements reached by all 
stakeholders. CADFund will determine its demanded investment return based on 
factors such as yield rate, risks evaluation, and deal structure. Return on investment 
includes income from dividends and capital appreciation. The Fund in theory will exit 
a project once it is up and running and generating a profit. The method of exit will 
vary from case to case and can include exit after Initial Public Offering, exit after the 
financed enterprise goes public in either domestic or overseas stock market or exit 
through transfer agreement (CDB, 2012: 2).  
Application for investment from CADFund is made by submitting an application form 
containing information regarding the project, the project investors, total project 
investment and investment amount needed. Based on this the Fund‟s investment 
team will decide if the project is worthy of investment. Interestingly, there is no direct 
access to the fund for African entrepreneurs. If Africa enterprises wish to apply for 
investment from CADFund, they must find a Chinese enterprise to partner with and 
then the Chinese enterprise must apply for investment from the Fund (CDB, 2012: 
2). This indicates that African enterprises will most likely have less say if they are to 
partner up with Chinese enterprises and receive funding from CADFund. It seems 
unlikely that in this setting African enterprises will be treated as equal partners. 
According to the CADFund website the projects which are invested in must abide by 
China's economic and foreign policies towards Africa; follow regulations regarding 
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Chinese enterprises' overseas investments; and satisfy relevant legislation and 
policy requirements in corresponding African host countries (CADFund, 2012). The 
interviewed senior manager noted that potential partners should possess 
complementary advantages against CADFund, combined with relevant industry 
competitiveness, investment experiences with Africa, the existence of local networks, 
competent management capability and team advantages, as well as understanding 
and recognition with CADFund investment and capital market principles.17 Potential 
partners should also be leading enterprises in their respective industry with clear 
long-term strategies in Africa, well-functioning governance structure, and outstanding 
working teams. It is unclear how this assessed and what kind of criteria must be met 
in order to gauge whether a Chinese enterprise is a leader in its industry and 
whether it has a clear long term strategy in Africa. The criteria provide, however, 
clearly indicate an envisaged role in promoting Chinese businesses that have a 
global potential. The driving force is a Chinese international strategy rather than 
putting African development in the first place.   
In order to receive funding from CADFund the so-called “qualified projects” must fulfil 
certain criteria such as; being regarded as an investment undertakings that is based 
in Africa or if it is based outside Africa then it must be indirectly invested in Africa or 
serve the interests of African countries, this criteria seems vague and it is unclear 
what exactly would qualify as “serving the interests of African countries”. Qualified 
projects are also supposed to demonstrate promising market prospects with a rapid 
yet steady growth potential and the ability to generate profits. Other criteria given by 
CDB for CADFund‟s decisions are that qualified projects should facilitate local 
economic development, and to contribute to general public‟s well-being 
improvement. Qualified project must follow African laws, and abide by local labour 
and environmental standards (CDB, 2012). It is not stipulated on the website what 
checks and balances are put in place by the Fund to monitor this, nor is there any 
indication for a role of African partners in this assessment. 
According to the interviewed CADFund senior manager, CADFund is committed to in 
adhering to environmental and social responsibilities under relevant international 
                                            
17
 Interview with Dr Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
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evaluation standards.18 This commitment is rather vague and does not provide 
concrete standards or measures which must be undertaken by CADFund or the 
enterprise to fulfil this mandate. A declaration on corporate social responsibility was 
announced at the closing ceremony of the Fourth Conference of Chinese and African 
Entrepreneurs, and it was jointly signed by the China Council for Promotion of 
International Trade, CADFund and CDB. The declaration aims to promote 
cooperation between China and Africa by encouraging mutual communication and 
understanding as well as encouraging scientific and technological cooperation 
between enterprises from both sides (Chinese Embassy to South Africa, 2012: 1). 
 
5.2.3 Projects undertaken  
Limited information is provided on CADFund‟s website regarding the projects which 
the Fund is involved in, and the information provided is outdated. For this reason 
news sources and information from an interview were consulted to attempt drawing 
up a list of some of CADFund‟s recent and past projects. According to the 
interviewee, to date CADFund has helped finance and support 60 projects across 30 
Africa countries.19 The Fund received a capital injection of US$2 billion during the 
July 2012 Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs, CADFund has pledged 
to use its increased resources to help finance Sino-African cooperation projects 
(People Daily, 2012: 1).  
 
When asked what projects CADFund was currently involved in, the interviewee 
noted the following projects;  
 
 Tanzania Mchuchuma and Ligana coal-electricity-iron project;  
 StarTimes Africa digital television project;  
 Ghana Asogli power plant project;  
 Nigeria Lekki free trade zone project and a  
 Zambia cotton planting project. 20  
 
                                            
18
 Interview with Dr Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
19
 Ibid 
20
 Ibid 
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Asked about some of CADFund‟s successful projects, the following projects were 
listed (none of them from the above list): 
 
 the Cotton Project in Malawi,  
 the Ethiopia Leather Manufacturing Project,  
 the Suez Economic Zone and  
 the Liberia Bong County Iron Ore Project. 21 
More specifically exploring CADFund‟s engagement in South Africa, its biggest area 
of operation, as stated above, the list of projects is presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2: CADFund Projects in South Africa 
Chery, a leading Chinese automaker has entered into a joint venture with CADFund 
to further explore the potential of the African car market. The new name under the 
joint venture is Chery Overseas Industrial Investment Co Ltd and Chery will have a 
55% investment stake. Chery sells around 15 000 cars in South Africa and Egypt 
respectively (China Daily, 2011).  
China First Automotive Works (FAW) announced in February 2012 that it would be 
constructing a US$ 100 million truck and passenger car plant in the Eastern Cape in 
South Africa. The plant will be built with funds obtained through CADFund (Ding, 
2012: 1). 
The Jinchuan Group, one of China‟s largest mining companies joined with CADFund 
to create a joint venture and paid US$ 227 million for an over 45 percent stake in 
Wesizwe, a South African platinum mining company. The Fund and Jinchuan 
pledged a further US$ 877 million to fund the development of Wesizwe's primary 
asset, a Greenfield platinum mine in the North West of South Africa (du Venage, 
                                            
21
 Interview with Dr  Hao Rui (Senior Manager, Research and Development Department, CADFund 
Beijing Office) on 12 July 2012 
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2012: 1).   
A consortium made up of Baiyin Non-Ferrous Group, CADFund and Long March 
Capital has bought two-thirds of Gold One, a South Africa gold producer and 
explorer (African Investor, 2011). 
In October 2010 Hebei Jidong Development Group and CADFund also jointly 
created a cement plant in South Africa. The cement plant is said to have a daily 
cement production capacity of 2,500 tons once operational (Capital Vue, 2011). 
Sources: media coverage, as indicated. 
CADFund is currently funding agriculture projects in Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Zambia and plan to extend funding to Sudan (Ncube, 2012: 1). Malawi is an 
illustration of the political role that CADFund plays in China‟s Africa policy. The late 
Malawian President Bingu wa Matharika has praised China‟s unconditional aid which 
it has offered Malawi. China and Malawi have only had diplomatic ties since January 
2008 when Malawi shifted allegiances from Taiwan to China. China has built a new 
parliament, conference centre, university, hotel and 100k kilometre road between 
Chitip and Karonga and has plans to build a national stadium for Malawi (Chikoko, 
2012: 1). Besides these broader cooperation projects, CADFund and the Chinese 
government are co-funding cotton planting projects which will enhance local cotton 
production and processing capacity in Malawi (Chikoko, 2012: 1). 
 
5.3 NEW STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP? – FOCAC V DISCUSSIONS 
CADFund reportedly finds it difficult to assign funds to a sufficient number of projects 
across Africa (Grimm, 2012: 1). A large amount of projects by the Fund seem to be 
in Southern Africa, where the Fund has two branches, one in Johannesburg and 
another in Lusaka. The Ministry of Commerce‟s Director General of the Department 
of West Asian and African Affairs, CADFund‟s political principal, noted that CADFund 
had focused mainly on projects in Eastern and Southern Africa and that it should 
increase its activities in West Africa (Sesay, 2012: 1).  
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CADFund is reportedly planning to partner with agricultural development banks in 
African countries to expand the investment of the Fund. China‟s cooperation with 
African development banks dates back to 1985 when the government started 
supporting the African Development Bank (AfDB). Since then China has been 
providing aid in to African banks. According to its website accessed [on 20 April 
2012] one of CADFund‟s core objectives is to expand Chinese farming investment in 
Africa. CADFund together with CDB want to partner with African agricultural 
companies and other financial institutions which support agricultural development 
(Ncube, 2012: 1).  
According to an article in China Daily, CADFund is shifting its investment strategy 
with the focus moving to infrastructure, manufacturing and agriculture after a capital 
injection into the Fund of US$ 2 billion (Ding, 2012: 1). Besides energy and 
resources, the Fund is looking to shift towards the above mentioned sectors. The 
new shift in strategy by the Fund is said to be in line with Africa‟s economic growth 
plan that prioritizes urbanisation and industrialisation (Ding, 2012: 1).  
 
South Africa Trade and Investment Minister, Rob Davies claimed that there had 
been a shift away from traditional partners such as the USA and European countries 
by South Africa and other African countries to emerging powers such as China and 
India (Gateway to Africa, 2012: 1). This is evident when considering that China has 
become Africa‟s largest trading partner.  The Fifth FOCAC meeting held in Beijing in 
July 2012 reiterated the important role which China is playing in African states. 
During the Forum, President Hu Jintao announced that China would double its loans 
to African countries compared to the 2009 FOCAC meeting, promising US$20 billion. 
The loans will be aimed specifically at supporting infrastructure, manufacturing, 
agriculture and supporting small and medium enterprises in African countries (Ghana 
Business News, 2012: 1). In line with this during the closing statement of the Fourth 
Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs, held in Beijing in July 2012 it was 
announced that more than twenty Chinese and African enterprises had signed eight 
economic cooperation projects with a total investment of US$ 341 million (Chinese 
Embassy to South Africa, 2012: 1).   
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In his speech regarding ties between China and Africa, Minister of Commerce, Mr 
Chen Deming noted that trade between China and Africa hit a record high of US$ 
166.3 billion in 2011 and that Chinese direct investment in African countries reached 
US$ 14.7 billon by end of 2011 (Chen, 2012: 1). Chinese projects in Africa such as a 
CADFund funded shoe factory in Ethiopia, a hydropower station in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) which was established with aid of Chinese credit and 
cotton plantations in Malawi cultivated by local farmers with instruction given by 
Chinese experts, painted a positive picture of China- Africa relations (Chen, 2012: 1).   
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon spoke at the Fifth FOCAC, and during his 
speech he noted that African countries involvement with China provides “opportunity 
for African countries to diversify their economies, create jobs and improve healthcare 
and education” (Asia One, 2012: 1). He also noted that there are three areas in 
particular in which FOCAC can better development of African countries. These areas 
are poverty reduction, in which case the Forum needs to increase development 
impact of trade and infrastructure projects and make sure that they better the lives of 
African people. Secondly the Forum can help strengthen African capacity by 
continuing skill and technical training and knowledge sharing between Chinese and 
African experts. Lastly the Forum needs to focus on Greener development by 
encouraging environmental awareness and assessing impact of projects on 
environment (CNTV, 2012: 1). The UN Secretary General also applauded China and 
Africa‟s relations as forwarding South-South Cooperation which the UN has 
promoted for many years (CNTV, 2012: 1).  
South Africa President Jacob Zuma thanked China, during the 2012 FOCAC 
meeting, for treating African countries as equals but also warned against continuing 
the unequal trade structure between Africa and China. Zuma highlighted that Africa 
was still heavily reliant on raw material exports to China whereas China exports a 
range of manufactured goods such as textiles and electrical products to African 
countries. This reliance on primary goods, according to Zuma, was not sustainable 
and African countries needed to focus on diversifying their economies if they hoped 
to compete in the international market place and grow their economies (Asia One, 
2012: 1).  
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President Zuma‟s speech highlighted the ongoing dilemma which many African 
countries face. Engagement with China is essential and beneficial in many cases yet 
African countries must make the decision of how to engage with one of the world 
economy‟s giants. If meant to diversify African economies, Chinese investment 
needed to be directed to underdeveloped sectors such as manufacturing.  . 
The above assertions by officials offer varying perspectives on the changing 
relationship between China and Africa. The role which African states play in China-
Africa relations and in international relations is often one of a weaker actor, one 
which relies on other states for assistance and guidance.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
CADFund is playing an increasingly prominent role in Africa and in numerous ways 
is helping the Chinese government to achieve its political and economic objectives in 
Africa. The Fifth FOCAC meeting has illustrated China‟s continued commitment to 
maintaining close ties with African countries. With US$ 20 billion in loans being made 
available by China for African states, China is investing in furthering its ties with 
Africa. Criticism from Africa about the structure of the relationship, however, is also 
voiced.  
 
Organisations such as CADFund are one way in which the Chinese government is 
promoting investment ties with the continent. With over 60 projects already up and 
running and with US$ 2 billion being injected into the Fund for future Sino-African 
cooperation projects, CADFund is proving to be an important institution in China-
Africa relations.  Increased economic and political engagement as well as “solidarity 
and cooperation with African countries” are objectives laid out in many of the 
Chinese government‟s policies regarding Africa (FOCAC, 2006: 3). CADFund is 
encouraging Chinese enterprises to begin operating in African countries by providing 
funding and advisory services and in this way fits well into the Chinese government‟s 
foreign policy objectives in Africa. 
 
While CADFund lays out numerous stipulations regarding funded enterprises 
adhering to local laws and acting in an environmentally and social conscious way, it 
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is unclear how this is monitored and to what degree African decision-makers are 
involved in their selection. This makes a direction towards African development 
clearly less certain than consideration of the Chinese priorities. Whether CADFund 
has mechanisms in place to assess and monitor enterprises activities is difficult to 
assess. One of the shortcoming of CADFund as an institution is that it lacks 
transparency. Behind the rhetoric offered by the website, little information is given 
regarding the way in which CADFund is truly fulfilling its mandate.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
China and Africa‟s increased interaction over the past decade has received attention 
from the media, academics, economists and politicians alike. The rise of China as a 
potential world economic power has sparked both concern and suspicion. Concern 
over China‟s impact in African states has been voiced by Western and African 
leaders. The Chinese economy has experienced robust growth since embarking on 
ambitious reforms to open up its economy to outside investment and trade, as well 
as policies geared towards encouraging Chinese enterprises to go abroad. China‟s 
rise in importance in the international arena has led to increased scrutiny of its 
foreign policies and internal policies. In order to gain a balanced view of China‟s 
engagement in African states it is necessary to examine the various components of 
their involvement.  
This thesis has chosen to focus on CADFund as its main unit of analysis, and has 
illustrated that the Fund fulfils both a political and economic role in China‟s relations 
with Africa.  The intention for this section is to provide answers to the research 
questions posed in Chapter 1, by drawing from the discussions and conclusions 
presented in the preceding chapters. Qualified answers will be given regarding the 
political and economic motivations behind China‟s interest in Africa. Conclusions are 
drawn from the structural organisation, investment approaches and projects of 
CADFund. The way in which CADFund fits into China‟s Africa Policy will be 
determined in this chapter by looking at the Fund‟s activities and how they fit into the 
principles set out in China‟s Africa Policy.  
According to the Chinese government, China‟s Africa Policy is a way “to present to 
the world the objectives of China's policy toward Africa”, the policy outlines 
“proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years” (FMPRC, 2006). 
How an institution such as CADFund fits into these objectives will be determined by 
looking at China‟s economic and political interests in Africa, which were presented in 
this paper. 
 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of issues which pertain to the remainder of the 
thesis and provided a background and contextualisation of China-Africa relations as 
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a whole and the key areas of interest for this thesis.   An important finding of this 
chapter is that China is not a monolithic entity. That, in fact, there exist a range of 
actors which need to be considered when trying to gain insight into China-Africa 
relations.  
 
Despite its authoritarian rule, the Chinese central government is not an omnipresent 
force, it is not in control of every aspect of China‟s engagement with African states. 
While China‟s government might even at times struggle to assert control over all 
internal matters, controlling activities beyond its borders (even by own citizens) is 
clearly often an over-stretch. This does not exempt the government from overall 
responsibility in international relations, but puts the debate about “China in Africa” 
somewhat into perspective.  
 
The control which the Chinese government has over an institution such as CADFund 
is difficult to gauge. The Fund meets with the Supervisory Board, which is made up 
of representatives from relevant Chinese government ministries, once or twice a year 
to receive policy information, which means that there is a certain level of government 
control; the fund clearly has to follow policies as set out by the government. The 
selection of projects by the Fund is likely to be guided by foreign policy 
considerations, at least to some extent. One such consideration is the Chinese 
government efforts to be perceived as a more equal partner to African states as 
opposed to other international actors across the continent - not just in resource rich 
states. This may explain the selection of CADFund‟s projects in states such as 
Malawi and Ethiopia. Based on the interviews conducted for this study, the day to 
day operations of the Fund appears to be controlled by the Fund itself. The fund 
does, however, explicitly mostly follow the rationale of Chinese economic interests, 
as illustrated; African development also features as a criterion for project selection, 
but without clear guidelines what this means and how to assess the achievement of 
this goal. 
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CHINA’S POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA 
Chapter 4 investigated some of the political motivations behind the Chinese 
government interest in African states. One such motivation is the Chinese 
governments One-China Policy. This policy is an important part of China‟s global 
foreign policy and the recognition of China over Taiwan is a non-negotiable criterion 
for having economic and political relations with China. The fact that African states 
are required to adhere to the One China Policy in order to build relations with China, 
clearly indicates that the rhetoric of China having a “no strings attached” relationship 
with African states is false.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3 China‟s relations with African countries have received a 
disproportionate amount of media attention when considering the Chinese 
perspective. For China, trade with Africa states only represents a small percentage 
compared with its trade with other regions of the world such as South East Asia or 
Europe; yet, for many African states, China represents an important international 
actor and is now the largest trading partner. Even though Chinese actors repeatedly 
assert that they are equal partners with Africa states, the relationship is highly 
unequal. China is now a world economic power and African states‟ economies are 
heavily reliant of trade and investment from China. When looking at the structure of 
China‟s trade relations with African states they are not that different from Western 
countries trade relations. Like Western states China is interested in resources from 
African states and as such is more involved in resource rich states such as Sudan 
and Nigeria. Although the Chinese government is making an effort to be seen as an 
equal partner to African states, Chinese actors in many way are rather similar to 
Africa‟s traditional trading partners.  
 
The fact that commitments have been made to redefine China and Africa‟s 
engagement – latest during the FOCAC V meeting in July 2012 – indicate that the 
Chinese government and African governments are aware of the fact that China-
Africa relations to date have not been based on equal partnership.  
 
This study highlights that by engaging with developing states of the south, the 
Chinese government has the opportunity to establish itself as a leader of the global 
south. It is already an economic giant in the developing world and is a vital trading 
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partner for many states. By increasing diplomatic ties in the form of increased 
cultural exchanges and other forms of interactions as is highlighted in China‟s Africa 
Policy, China has the opportunity to create an image of leader in the global south. In 
this regard Africa offers China the opportunity to assert its leadership potential.  
 
In this context, an institution like CADFund helps promote South-South Cooperation 
by increasing investment by Chinese enterprises in African states. The growing 
presence of Chinese enterprises in Africa leads to an increasing number of Chinese 
citizens in African states, inevitably resulting in interactions between African locals 
and Chinese. Indirectly, CADFund is thus promoting the people-to-people interaction 
that is highlighted as one of the aims of China‟s Africa Policy. 
 
Resource acquisition and the search for new markets are two main economic driving 
forces behind China‟s engagement with African states, as argued above. Africa 
offers China a large relatively untapped market for their exports. Although Chinese 
investment activities in Africa are focused mainly on resource-rich states such as 
Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia, Chinese involvement in countries such as 
Malawi and Ethiopia is on the rise and serves as an indication that the Chinese 
government‟s is interested the African continent for reasons other than just access to 
energy and minerals. Beyond resource supply, African states provide the Chinese 
government with the opportunity to improve their image international and be viewed 
as a responsible world power. Various aid projects and UN peacekeeping missions, 
supported by Chinese troops, in Africa help the Chinese government to create an 
image of China as a more peaceful and responsible emerging power.   
 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC INTEREST IN AFRICA - BEYOND RESOURCES  
Chapter 3 of this thesis explores the economic motivations behind China‟s interest in 
African states. The Chinese government benefits from its engagement with African 
states by gaining access to resources, new market potential and political allies. For 
African states the benefit is that they receive infrastructure development and 
investment. Yet, as the investor, China is the stronger partner in this relationship. 
While it might not be morally questionable to act in a self-interested manner, it is 
essential to frame China-Africa relations in an understanding of self-interest; a 
thorough analysis requires moving away from idealistic rhetoric.  
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Indeed, African leaders might be able to learn – and benefit – from China‟s economic 
development strategy. China‟s focus on developing local industries and encouraging 
them to expand their operations internationally has contributed to its robust 
economic growth in recent years. African leaders could benefit from directing 
Chinese investment to key economic sectors. Skills development and education 
investment is also a key area which African states should focus investment on.       
 
This thesis has highlighted the need for African leaders to take control of China‟s 
presence in order to derive the maximum benefit from this engagement. China‟s 
presence in Africa is as Dambisa Moyo puts it a “golden opportunity” for African 
states if they use it well (Moyo, 2009: 120).  In her book “Dead Aid”, Moyo 
provocatively asserts that it is better for African people to face hardship in a state 
with a thriving economy than to be faced with an aid-dependent states in which 
opportunities to lift oneself out of poverty do not exist (Moyo, 2009: 122).  African 
states are being offered more opportunities for economic growth due to Chinese 
investment and Chinese aid projects have in some cases improved living standards 
for African people. However the fact that Chinese labour and enterprises are still 
largely used in aid projects often means that African enterprises and labourers are 
overlooked. In order to benefit from Chinese economic engagement, African leaders 
need to put policies in place which protect local industries and local labour.  For 
instance African governments could insist that Chinese enterprises use a certain 
percentage of local labour.  
 
The Chinese government promotes economic ties with Africa by providing Chinese 
business wishing to invest in African countries with information, coordination and 
financial assistance.  Ease of funding procurement and access to information has 
become a motivating factor for Chinese businesses opening their operations in 
African countries. The Chinese government has set up investment and trade 
promotion centre around Africa, these centres provide business consultation 
services, special funds and make approval procedures less complicated for 
enterprises. One such example of a centre is CADFund which provides Chinese 
businesses with information about the country they are investing in and provide a 
source of funding for enterprises. 
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CADFUND’S ROLE IN CHINA’S AFRICA POLICY 
The main question posed by this study was regarding the role which CADFund plays 
in China‟s Africa Policy. The mandate of the Fund is to provide funding and advisory 
and support services to Chinese enterprises wishing to invest in African states. With 
60 completed projects to date, the Fund has arguably indeed helped to progress the 
Chinese government‟s goal of encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa.   
The promotion of South-South Cooperation is also in noted in China‟s Africa Policy 
and is often mentioned in Chinese government‟s diplomatic rhetoric, institutions such 
as CADFund and meetings such as FOCAC are useful in promoting increased 
interaction between Africa and China which in turn promotes the idea of South-South 
Cooperation. To this end CADFund is assisting Chinese enterprises in Africa. It is, 
however, not mandated with helping African enterprises in China or in Africa. While 
this fund has potential to benefit Africa in terms of increasing FDI into Africa, the 
Fund clearly is China-centric and primarily intended to achieve the interests of 
Chinese firms, with little if any input of African partners. African enterprises are not 
the primary focus of the Fund and African countries cannot voice their interests and 
priorities within the fund, since it is administered by the Chinese Development Bank. 
There is a potential conflict in promoting Chinese enterprises and wanting to foster 
African development at the same time (Munyi, 2011: 16); yet, the fund does not 
explore or address this tension.  
 
An additional point of criticism is a lack of transparency. The CADFund website as 
one of the most vital sources of information for the fund, is outdated with regards to 
the information it offers. The site seems to offer all the relevant information about the 
fund but under the offered headings, there is little or no up-to-date information 
regarding the Fund‟s current or past activities in African states. Without proper 
information it is difficult to gauge the impact of CADFund in African countries. This 
ultimately devalues the Chinese claim of being a „better partner‟ than Western states. 
Greater transparency by the Fund itself regarding its activities in Africa would serve 
to better our understanding of the Fund and its activities.  
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Recommendations for future research are encouraged in order to build on this 
specific field. For example, more extensive research could be pursued concerning 
CADFund linkages with the Chinese government. Together with this, questions 
regarding the perceived effectiveness of CADFund could also be addressed – 
specifically by investigating how projects are managed and monitored by CADFund. 
In these follow-up explorations, theoretical frameworks such as the “principal-agent 
theory” could also be incorporated as frameworks with which to view CADFund‟s 
relationship with the Chinese government. 
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